Essays in empirical corporate finance by Demirtaş, Gül & Demirtas, Gul
  
 
 
 
ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
by  
GÜL DEMİRTAŞ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Management  
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sabancı University 
October 2014 
  

  
 
 
 
 
© Gül Demirtaş 2014 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
 
GÜL DEMİRTAŞ 
Ph.D. Dissertation, 2014 
 
Dissertation Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Şerif Aziz Şimşir 
 
 
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; corporate governance; social ties;  
board meetings; shareholder returns 
 
 
This dissertation contains two articles, each of which investigates whether the attitude 
and behavior of directors and executives during the merger negotiation process affect 
merger outcomes. Both articles rely on a unique and extensive dataset, manually 
extracted from SEC filings. In the first article, using this dataset and merger-related 
news articles, I detect if a social tie between directors or executives of merging firms is 
effective during the making of the deal. The results show that the existence of a social 
tie significantly reduces abnormal announcement returns accruing to the combined 
entity and to the acquirer firm. This adverse effect is driven by deals in which the tie is 
distant. Social ties also significantly decrease the likelihood of receiving competing 
bids. Moreover, connected deals, particularly those involving close ties, are associated 
with lower financial advisory fees, a shorter negotiation period and a higher likelihood 
of target director retention. The second article focuses on the target board’s meeting 
activity from the date of the first contact with the acquirer to the announcement date. 
Rapid involvement of the target board in merger talks increases target shareholder 
returns and premiums, especially when shareholders have weak control over their firms 
and are more in need of board protection. In contrast, the number of target board 
meetings does not appear to affect shareholder wealth. Both early board involvement 
and a high board meeting count reduce the likelihood of an excessive target termination 
fee. Furthermore, early board involvement hurts target CEOs by decreasing their 
retention likelihood. 
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Bu tez, yönetim kurulu üyeleri ve üst düzey yöneticilerin şirket birleşmesi görüşmeleri 
sırasındaki tutum ve davranışlarının birleşme sonuçlarına etkisini inceleyen iki 
makaleden oluşmaktadır. İki makalede de SEC izahnamelerinden manuel olarak 
toplanmış kapsamlı ve özgün bir veri seti kullanılmıştır. İlk makalede, söz konusu veri 
setine ve basında yer alan haberlere dayanılarak, birleşen şirketlerin yöneticileri veya 
yönetim kurulu üyeleri arasında birleşme sürecinde etkili olan bir tanışıklığın bulunup 
bulunmadığı saptanmıştır. Şirketler arasında böyle bir sosyal bağ bulunduğunda, 
birleşmiş şirketin ve alıcı şirketin duyuru tarihi çevresindeki anormal hisse senedi 
getirileri azalmaktadır. Bu olumsuz etki, bağın zayıf olduğu durumlardan 
kaynaklanmaktadır. Sosyal bağlar, başka alıcılardan teklif alma olasılığını da 
azaltmaktadır. Ayrıca, yöneticiler arasında sosyal bir bağ olduğunda, özellikle bu bağ 
güçlüyse, finansal danışmanlara ödenen ücretler azalmakta, pazarlık süresi kısalmakta 
ve hedef firma yönetim kurulu üyelerinin alıcı şirkette görevlerini sürdürme olasılığı 
artmaktadır. Tezin ikinci makalesinde ise, hedef şirketin alıcı şirketle ilk görüşmesinden 
işlemin duyurulmasına kadar geçen sürede hedef şirket yönetim kurulunun düzenlediği 
toplantıların zamanlamasına ve sayısına odaklanılmıştır. Yapılan analizler, hedef şirket 
yönetim kurulunun görüşmelere erken dahil olmasının şirketin hissedarlarının 
getirilerine ve birleşme primlerine pozitif etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu ilişki, 
özellikle hissedarların şirket üzerindeki kontrollerinin zayıf olduğu, dolayısıyla yönetim 
kurulu tarafından korunmaya daha çok ihtiyaç duydukları durumlarda geçerlidir. Öte 
yandan, hedef şirket yönetim kurulunun süreç boyunca düzenlediği toplantıların 
sayısının hissedarların getirilerine bir etkisi bulunmamıştır. Ayrıca, yönetim kurulunun 
sürece erken katılması ve çok toplantı yapması yüksek bir fesih tazminatının 
onaylanması olasılığını azaltmaktadır. Son olarak, yönetim kurulunun görüşmelere 
erken dahil olması, hedef şirketin genel müdürünün alıcı şirkette görevlendirilme 
olasılığını azaltmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity facilitates the allocation of corporate 
assets to their best possible use. Given their critical role for the reallocation of assets 
among firms and the huge global M&A volume amounting to an annual average of 
USD 2.6 trillion since 20061, it is crucial to understand how M&A markets work and 
how the incentives of the key players shape the dynamics of these markets. To this end, 
the M&A literature has long been investigating whether and how behavioral biases, 
agency conflicts and information asymmetries between players affect merger outcomes. 
The two articles in this dissertation aim to shed further light on this area, by studying 
two different aspects of the deal-making process. 
The first article, entitled “Social Ties in the Making of an M&A Deal” 
investigates whether social ties between targets and acquirers affect merger outcomes. I 
detect the existence of a social tie between directors or executives of merging firms, by 
manually collecting data from merger-related SEC filings and news articles. My 
identification method ensures that the tie is still active during the making of the deal and 
does not impose any particular channel (e.g. past professional or educational affiliation) 
through which the social tie could have been formed. I hypothesize that while the 
existence of a tie may improve merger results by enhancing information sharing 
between the two firms, it may also harm merger performance due to the familiarity bias 
that it creates. The net effect depends on the relative magnitudes of these two forces. 
The results indicate that the existence of a tie is associated with significantly lower 
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the combined entity and 
to the acquirer firm. This adverse effect is mainly driven by deals in which the social tie 
                                                 
1 This figure is based on Mergers & Acquisition Review reports published by Thomson 
Reuters. 
 2 
is distant. Irrespective of the degree of the tie, acquirer-target social ties significantly 
decrease the likelihood of receiving competing bids in the private takeover process. 
Moreover, connected deals, particularly those involving close ties, are associated with 
lower financial advisory fees and a shorter negotiation period. Interestingly, although 
close ties do not affect merger outcomes for target shareholders, such ties help target 
directors negotiate for positions in the merged firm. 
In the second article, entitled “Board Involvement in the M&A Negotiation 
Process”, I examine whether the strong engagement of target firm directors in the sale 
process affects merger outcomes for target shareholders. I expect that a target board 
actively involved in the sale process will be more informed about the process and this 
information advantage will allow it to perform its monitoring function more effectively 
and to provide higher quality advice. These services, in return, should improve merger 
outcomes for target shareholders. To test the validity of this conjecture, I first turn to 
merger-related SEC filings to extract the dates of target board meetings where the 
directors discuss the current state of the merger negotiations. Using this data, I then 
create two measures of target board involvement in the negotiation process: the number 
of days for the target board to meet after the start of the sale process and the number of 
meetings held by the board over the entire process. I find that target board’s early 
involvement in merger negotiations is associated with significantly higher target 
cumulative abnormal returns. This effect is driven by the cases in which target 
shareholders have weak control over the firm and hence are more in need of board 
protection. This finding also holds when takeover premiums are used to measure the 
wealth effects of mergers for target shareholders. Furthermore, while I find no effect of 
the two measures of target board activity on the likelihood of a competitive negotiation 
process, I find that these measures, both separately and jointly, have a negative relation 
with the probability of accepting an unreasonably high target termination fee. I also 
report that the target board’s early involvement is associated with a lower probability of 
target CEO retention, consistent with the argument that close board monitoring makes it 
harder for the CEOs to discuss their post-takeover career plans with the acquirers and 
possibly to make concessions to the detriment of their shareholders. 
The findings from both studies are instrumental when evaluating whether the 
executives and directors of merging firms have taken due care and acted in the best 
interests of their shareholders in structuring the deal. While the deals with close ties 
usually attract the attention of the shareholders, regulators and the media, the first article 
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shows that the deals with distant ties should also be approached with caution as they 
have adverse implications for the acquirer shareholders. Similarly, of the two attributes 
of target board activity cited in shareholder lawsuits, early board involvement in 
negotiations turns out to be a critical factor for target shareholder value creation. In 
contrast, the other attribute, the number of board meetings held, does not seem to affect 
target shareholder returns. These results may be particularly useful for courts when 
assessing the adequacy of the merger negotiation process. The findings of this 
dissertation also provide potentially useful guidance for executives and directors. 
Acquirer executives and directors should be wary of the potential adverse effects of 
familiarity bias when they are negotiating with an acquaintance. On the other hand, it is 
important for target directors to get involved in merger talks early in the process and 
take the necessary measures to control potential conflicts of interests between the CEOs 
and the shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2 SOCIAL TIES IN THE MAKING OF AN M&A DEAL 
SOCIAL TIES IN THE MAKING OF AN M&A DEAL 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In December 2006, Huntington Bancshares Inc., a large regional bank 
headquartered in Ohio, announced that it would be acquiring its Ohio neighbor, Sky 
Financial Group Inc. The day after the announcement, Huntington and Sky Financial 
hosted a joint conference call to inform investors about their expectations from the 
merger and plans for the future. During this broadcast, Tom Hoaglin, chairman, 
president and CEO of Huntington, commented on how they viewed the risks associated 
with the transaction: 
   Obviously all mergers come with execution and integration risks. Let me... 
outline why we are confident that such risks are low in this transaction. 
First, as Don [Huntington’s CFO] noted earlier, we've completed 
significant due diligence. Second, Marty [Sky Financial’s chairman, 
president and CEO] and I have known each other for years and the same 
can be said for managers throughout both organizations. This familiarity 
makes for open communication and trust, key elements of moving a merger 
ahead smoothly...2 
Tom Hoaglin points out his prior relationship with the target CEO as a catalyst for 
improving communication and therefore feels confident that risks associated with this 
transaction is low.  The investors, however, were not as confident about this deal as was 
Mr. Hoaglin. The stock price of Huntington fell by 7% on the day of the conference, 
reaching its lowest level in 10 months. The investors were mainly concerned about the 
                                                 
2  Huntington Bancshares and Sky Financial Group Announce Merger Agreement - 
Final. (2006, December 21). Voxant Fair Disclosure Wire. 
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large deal size, the risks of entering into new markets, the challenges that would be 
faced by executives who used to operate a smaller bank, and the decreased likelihood of 
Huntington itself becoming an acquisition target (Mazzucca, 2006; Reuters News, 21 
December 2006). This sharp fall in stock price also affected what Sky Financial 
shareholders would receive from the deal, since 90% of the payment was in Huntington 
stock. How is it possible, thus, that the two CEOs failed to foresee investors’ concerns, 
even if they were better equipped for an open discussion of potential risks given their 
prior social relationship with each other? More generally, in what ways would 
familiarity between the directors or executives of merging firms affect the negotiation 
process and the merger outcomes? 
In this study, I examine the M&A transactions in which a director or an executive 
from the target and the acquirer are tied to each other. By detecting social ties from the 
SEC disclosures of the merging firms and from the news articles, I ensure that the tie 
was actually effective during the making of the deal. I hypothesize that a social tie 
connecting the two firms may have two counteracting effects: as suggested by Tom 
Hoaglin’s above remarks, a potential bright side of a tie is that it may improve the 
information flow during the takeover process. A better information flow may, in turn, 
reduce the significant costs associated with information gathering. Specifically, the 
parties may feel a lower need for financial advisory services, decreasing the fees paid to 
investment banks. An improved information flow may also allow the parties to reach an 
understanding of the other party’s operations and intrinsic value more easily, and hence 
reduce the time it takes to conclude merger talks. Furthermore, as the Huntington CEO 
states above, an open communication may reduce execution and integration risks, which 
are of great concern in a merger transaction. Overall, these effects will lead to better 
merger outcomes, as compared to deals without a social tie.  
There is, however, a potential dark side to deals with social ties. The executives or 
directors who are socially tied may suffer from familiarity bias; a cognitive bias which 
leads to a tendency to favor familiar choices over unfamiliar ones due to a general fear 
of the unknown and the unfamiliar. Familiarity bias may cause directors and executives 
to feel more informed and competent when making deals with connected parties. As a 
result, they may underestimate the risks of the merger and may overestimate its 
potential synergies. This unfunded optimism may lead managers to put less emphasis on 
due diligence. A less vigilant due diligence, in turn, may hasten the negotiation process, 
possibly resulting in a premature closure. Moreover, due to a pessimistic approach 
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towards unfamiliar firms, familiarity bias may reduce the likelihood of contacting other, 
and possibly better, merger candidates outside the network. Taken together, I expect the 
distortions created by the familiarity bias to harm merger performance. The two effects 
of a social tie, enhanced information exchange and familiarity bias, however, are not 
mutually exclusive. Which of these two effects is stronger is an important empirical 
question that I investigate in this study. 
For a sample of 522 M&A deals between 2004 and 2008, I identify 79 deals with 
a social tie between the target and acquirer. Since information sharing may enhance as 
the degree of the interpersonal tie increases, I further split the connected deals into 37 
deals with close ties and 42 with distant ties. I detect the existence and the degree of 
social ties by reading SEC filings made by the two firms about the transaction and the 
news covering the deal. If it is stated in the news sources or SEC filings that a top 
manager or director from the merging firms knows each other very well or that they are 
friends or are very familiar with each other, I classify these deals as having close ties. I 
group the remainder as deals with distant ties.  
My research indicates that when a social tie exists at the top level of the two 
firms, the announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the combined 
firm (i.e. a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer firms) is 2.8 
percentage points lower compared to non-connected deals. In contrast to the average 
combined CAR of 2.02% in non-connected deals, this reduction is economically large. 
This negative effect is mainly driven by deals with distant ties, which reduce combined 
CARs significantly by 4 percentage points. The results suggest that when there is a 
distant tie, the negative effect of familiarity bias on combined CARs outbalances any 
positive effect of improved information exchange. On the other hand, when the tie is 
close, the information exchange improves further and its greater positive effect is able 
to offset the negative effect of familiarity. As a result, in terms of combined CARs, 
there is no difference between deals with close ties and non-connected deals.  I find 
similar results for acquirer CARs. Connected deals reduce acquirer CARs by 2.4 
percentage points and this effect is again driven by deals with distant ties, with close 
ties having no effect on acquirer CARs. With respect to target CARs and premiums paid 
to targets, connected deals are not significantly different from non-connected deals, 
irrespective of the closeness of the tie. It is possible that the impact of familiarity bias 
on the target firm stays limited due to the serious litigation threat faced by target 
managers and directors.  
 7 
My results on the impact of social ties on CARs are consistent with those of Ishii 
and Xuan (2014) and Wu (2011) who also find a negative impact of social ties on 
acquirer and combined CARs. However, my results are in contrast to those of Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) who report a positive impact as well as to those of Renneboog and Zhao 
(2013) who report an insignificant impact. This disparity possibly stems from the 
alternative definitions of social ties used by these authors. Cai and Sevilir (2012) and 
Renneboog and Zhao (2013) focus on ties formed by directors working on the same 
board at the time of the acquisition; Wu (2011) examines ties formed by directors or 
executives working on both firms within 3 years prior to the merger and Ishii and Xuan 
(2014) construct a measure based on educational and professional ties formed in the 
past. The distinction I make is that I identify social ties from the merger-related SEC 
disclosures and news sources. The first advantage that this method provides is that it 
does not impose a particular channel by which the social tie could have been formed. 
Hence it improves upon prior studies which require that interpersonal ties be formed 
through a specific channel, such as a past or present educational or professional 
affiliation. The second advantage of this method is that it ensures that the tie I locate is 
still active at the time of the takeover and that it actually played a role in the making of 
the deal. In that regard, it is in contrast to Ishii and Xuan (2014) who assume that a 
social tie has been formed between two individuals if they went to the same school or 
worked at the same firm and that this tie still exists during merger negotiations. My 
method is free of such assumptions since the tie is actually mentioned in recent merger-
related documents. Furthermore, my distinction between close and distant ties allows 
me to observe what effect, if any, a further improvement in information sharing has on 
merger outcomes. 
In further analysis, I investigate how social ties between the acquirer and the 
target affect various aspects of the negotiation process. I first examine the competitive 
nature of the takeover process. I find that the existence of a close or a distant tie 
significantly decreases the likelihood of receiving bids from multiple bidders during the 
private takeover process. This finding is consistent with the familiarity bias hypothesis, 
which predicts a failure to fully consider all alternatives due to a dislike of the 
unfamiliar. I then examine how the length of the private takeover process is affected 
when there is a social tie between the merging parties. Both familiarity bias and 
information sharing hypotheses predict a shorter time to complete negotiations. 
However, deals with close ties may be expected to take even a shorter time to be 
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completed as they are expected to further improve information sharing. The results 
support these predictions: in the average non-connected deal, it takes around 5 months 
from the beginning of the merger talks until the announcement of the deal. Holding 
other things equal, connected deals take about 20 days less to complete. Deals with 
close ties shorten the takeover process significantly by about 40 days whereas those 
with distant ties have a negative but insignificant effect. I also investigate whether and 
how the fees that targets pay to their financial advisors are affected by the existence of a 
tie. Again, both hypotheses predict lower fees but I expect the effect to be stronger for 
deals with close ties. In line with this expectation, I find that in connected deals targets 
pay significantly lower fees to financial advisors and that this effect is mainly driven by 
deals with close ties.  
As a final analysis, I investigate whether the existence of a social tie affects the 
percentage of target directors who continue to serve in the merged firm’s board. My 
results indicate that when there is a social tie between the merging parties, the 
percentage of the target board retained in the combined firm increases by 4.4 percentage 
points. A close tie increases percentage retained by about 10.8 percentage points 
whereas a distant tie has no effect on director retention. This relation continues to hold 
at the director level. A target director is more likely to be retained in the combined 
board when s/he is closely connected with a director or manager of the acquirer. 
Furthermore, even if a director is not connected himself/herself, his/her likelihood of 
being retained increases if another target director or manager is closely connected to the 
acquirer. Having a distant tie, however, does not increase the odds of a director 
remaining on the board. It appears that a distant tie is not close enough to generate 
private benefits for the person with the social tie or his/her colleagues. 
Given that connected deals constitute 32% of the total deal volume in my sample 
of 522 M&A deals in the period from 2004 to 2008, it is important to understand their 
impact on value creation. Taken together, my results suggest that social ties between 
two merging firms lead to lower value creation for acquirer shareholders and 
shareholders overall. A distinction based on the degree of the social tie reveals that 
deals with distant ties drive this adverse effect. In deals with distant ties, the negative 
effects of familiarity bias appear to dominate any positive information-based effect. 
Close ties, on the other hand, have no significant impact on merger performance, 
implying that these ties lead to a further improvement in information exchange, which 
in turn enables information-based positive effects to offset the negative effects of 
 9 
familiarity bias. Hence although acquirer managers, like the Huntington CEO above, are 
likely to feel confident when making connected deals, my results suggest a caution 
against such deals, especially when the social tie is not close enough to sufficiently 
improve information flow.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I first construct 
the counteracting hypotheses about the effects of social ties on merger outcomes and 
review the related literature. In Section 2.3, I introduce my sample and the method I use 
to identify social ties. In Section 2.4, I analyze the impact of social ties on 
announcement returns. Section 2.5 and 2.6 present how social ties affect the private 
takeover process and target board retention, respectively. Section 2.7 concludes the 
paper. 
2.2 Hypotheses and Related Literature 
In the first section of this part, I construct two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses 
on the potential effect of social ties on merger outcomes. In the second section, I review 
the prior literature investigating if and how the existence of interpersonal ties in an 
M&A context affects the merger process and outcomes. 
2.2.1 Potential Effects of Social Ties on Merger Outcomes 
2.2.1.1 The dark side: Familiarity bias 
Familiarity bias can be defined as a “general sense of comfort with the known and 
discomfort with-even distaste for and fear of-the alien and distant” (Huberman, 2001). 
In their seminal work on familiarity bias, Heath and Tversky (1991) ask people general 
knowledge questions and request them to assess the probability with which their answer 
is correct. The respondents are then provided a choice between betting on their own 
response or on a lottery. The probability of winning the lottery is set equal to the 
probability that the respondent believes his own response to be correct. The authors 
hypothesize that people will prefer to bet on their own judgment in a context where they 
feel knowledgeable or competent but that they will prefer the lottery when they feel 
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uninformed. With a series of experiments, Heath and Tversky (1991) provide strong 
evidence for this competence hypothesis. Furthermore, they show that the strategy of 
betting on own judgment performs worse than that of betting on the lottery.  
A preference for the familiar, which Heath and Tversky (1991) document from 
their controlled experiments, also manifests itself in multiple financial settings. French 
and Poterba (1991) observe that investors display a home country bias and hold almost 
all of their wealth in domestic assets, foregoing the possibility of reducing their risks 
significantly by better international diversification. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) extend 
home country bias to the local case. They show that the US mutual fund managers 
prefer to hold stocks of firms headquartered in nearby locations. Another widespread 
manifestation of familiarity bias is employees’ preference for their employer’s stock 
when allocating their retirement savings (Benartzi, 2001). Due to this so-called own 
company bias, employees face the risk of losing both their labor income and pension 
funds upon the failure of their company. Familiarity bias is observed even in product 
markets: Customers of a given company are significantly more likely than customers of 
other companies to invest in the corresponding company’s stock (Huberman, 2001; 
Keloharju, Knupfer, and Linnainmaa, 2012).  
In all of the above cases, investors’ behavior contradicts the prescription of 
portfolio theory for holding well-diversified portfolios (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965). A view of familiarity bias purely as a psychological heuristic without 
any rational background would predict that a portfolio overweighed on familiar assets 
should not overperform a well-diversified portfolio. Indeed, Cohen (2009) and 
Keloharju, Knupfer, and Linnainmaa (2012) show that allocations to familiar assets do 
not lead to higher portfolio performance while Benartzi (2001) and Døskeland and 
Hvide (2011) document that they actually lead to significantly lower performance. This 
evidence may indicate that people choose to invest in the familiar just because they 
‘feel’ more informed, more competent and more comfortable. A series of prior studies 
suggest that this is indeed the case. First, surveys of investors reveal that they expect 
higher returns from familiar assets and view them as less risky. (Benartzi, 2001; Strong 
and Xu, 2003; Kilka and Weber, 2000). Second, in an experiment in which participants 
try to guess the winner of NBA matches, Hall, Ariss, and Todorov (2007) report that 
people have a tendency to predict that more familiar teams are more likely to win even 
though statistical data obviously favor the less familiar teams. This lower reliance on 
statistical cues impairs decision-making and decreases participants’ accuracy in 
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predicting outcomes. Third, the familiarity bias model of Cao et al. (2011) posits that 
individuals who are faced with uncertainty are inclined to focus on worst-case (or at 
least, bad-case) scenarios when they consider whether to choose unfamiliar strategies, 
such as investing in unfamiliar stocks. An individual prefers a strategy over the familiar 
strategy only when that strategy has a higher expected utility even under bad-case 
scenarios.  
Given the prior evidence on familiarity bias influencing many different financial 
decisions, it is reasonable to expect that the behavior of top managers and directors may 
also be distorted by this bias during deal making. If this is indeed the case, how would 
the negotiation process and outcomes be affected in deals with socially connected 
firms? In accordance with the model of Cao et al. (2011), directors and top managers 
may focus on bad-case scenarios when considering merging with unfamiliar firms; due 
to this pessimistic perspective, they may fail to consider better alternatives outside of 
their network, leading to reduced competition. The extract below provides a concrete 
example and may suggest that Harris Simmons, CEO of Zions, may have missed better 
alternatives if he had put unwarranted priority to Amegy Bancorp among all possible 
acquisition candidates:  
   Johnson [Amegy’s Chairman] and Zions CEO Harris Simmons had 
worked together at Allied back in the early 1980s and had kept in close 
contact ever since... "We were close enough where I said, 'If you're ever 
interested in a deal, please tell us," Simmons says.  
- quoted from Engen (2006) 
Directors and top managers may perceive themselves as more informed and 
competent when making deals with connected parties. Analogous to the survey results 
by Benartzi (2001), Strong and Xu (2003) and Kilka and Weber (2000) above, they may 
underestimate the risks involved in the integration process and may overestimate 
potential synergies. This unfounded optimism coupled with a decreased reliance on 
statistical cues as suggested by Hall, Ariss, and Todorov (2007) may cause firms to be 
less vigilant in due diligence and to be less willing to ask for professional advice from 
investment banks.  
Furthermore, a less cautious due diligence review and reduced competition may 
precipitate the private negotiation process. However, as suggested by Jemison and 
Sitkin (1986), a hurried negotiation process is dysfunctional when it forces premature 
closure since “premature closure can reduce the opportunity for more careful and 
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dispassionate consideration of issues of both strategic and organizational fit”, possibly 
leading to less successful deals. 
In conclusion, familiarity bias is expected to reduce the competition in the 
takeover process, to decrease decision makers’ reliance on professional investment 
advice and to result in a premature closure by shortening the negotiation process. 
Overall, these effects will potentially lead to lower abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. However, the negative impact of familiarity bias on target 
announcement returns may remain limited since target managers and directors are likely 
to be more cautious in decision making due to the severe litigation threat that they face 
around the sale of the firm. 
2.2.1.2 The bright side: Better information flow 
A potential bright side of a social tie in an M&A context is that it may improve 
the information flow during the negotiation process. Evidence from group decision-
making literature lends support for this argument. Zaccaro and Lowe (1988) study the 
effect of interpersonal cohesion on group performance, where interpersonal cohesion is 
defined as “the degree to which positive interpersonal relationships exist among 
members of a group”. They hypothesize that interpersonal cohesion will increase the 
number of interactions among group members. They assign 158 US students to small 
groups and observe their behavior when performing a task and find strong evidence for 
their hypothesis. In a similar study, Jehn and Shah (1997) distinguish between groups 
made up only of friends or only of acquaintances and study how these two kinds of 
groups differ in their functioning. One of their hypotheses is that friendship based 
groups will share more information than will acquaintance based ones. These 
researchers find support for this hypothesis by observing the behavior of small groups 
when assigned a decision-making or a motor task. Gruenfeld et al. (1996) extend this 
line of literature by studying how group members behave when information is not fully 
shared among them. They design an experiment in which each group member possesses 
several unique clues for solving a murder mystery to which no other member has 
access. It turns out that groups with familiar members are more likely to correctly solve 
the murder case, by pooling all necessary information to identify the correct suspect. 
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Studies above from group decision-making literature indicate that as interpersonal 
ties intensify, information sharing increases. This evidence from carefully controlled 
experiments is also supported by survey data: Knapp, Ellis, and Williams (1980) survey 
1,114 individuals and ask them to rate their communicative behavior across six different 
types of relationship levels, ranging from acquaintance to lover. The results reveal that 
survey participants perceive increases in communication and information exchange as 
the relationship intensifies. DiMaggio and Louch (1998), on the other hand, survey 
1,444 participants and investigate the forces in effect when individuals are making 
purchases from sellers with whom they have noncommercial ties. Participants are asked 
whether they would reveal that the car they were selling, although currently sound, had 
transmission problems in the past. Results show that sellers are twice as likely to hide 
this fact from strangers as from relatives. 
Recent studies show that personal ties lead to enhanced information flow in a 
wide range of financial contexts, too. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) show that 
interpersonal ties between firms and their banks lead to more favorable financing terms 
but these favorable terms are justified by better ex-post performance, suggesting that 
social networks lead to better information flow. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) 
show that sell-side analysts outperform on their stock recommendations when they have 
an educational link to the top management of the company that they cover. This result is 
consistent with social networks providing cheaper access to information. In a related 
study, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) find a similar effect of educational ties 
between mutual fund portfolio managers and directors of public companies. Portfolio 
managers invest more on connected firms and have significantly higher returns on these 
holdings relative to the returns from non-connected ones.  Pan, Cai, and Li (2012) 
report that firms with executives and directors that are more central in the social 
network experience smaller IPO underpricing. The researchers attribute this finding to a 
higher ability of well-connected managers to mitigate information asymmetry in IPO 
firms.  
Given the above evidence on the relation between interpersonal connections and 
improved information exchange, a social tie between target and acquirer firms can be 
expected to improve information flow during the negotiation process and hence to 
reduce the significant costs associated with information gathering. A direct impact of 
enhanced information exchange could be a lower dependence on investment banks for 
financial advice (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). This prediction also follows from Golubov, 
 14 
Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) who report that bidders are less likely to retain a financial 
advisor when information asymmetry in the deal is lower. A better information flow 
may also reduce the ambiguities about the details on the merger agreement. These 
ambiguities may bring about disputes in the integration phase and increase integration 
risks (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Hence, a social tie between the two parties may lower 
integration risks by ironing out these ambiguities. On the other hand, Aktas et al. (2012) 
argue that a less opaque target may be easier to value and so may require a shorter 
private deal process. In a similar vein, I expect that deals with a social tie take a shorter 
time to complete. However, this shorter duration does not indicate a premature closure, 
as opposed to the discussions about familiarity bias above. 
In conclusion, an improved information exchange will decrease information 
gathering costs and the dependence on financial advisors, shorten the time to closure, 
and will reduce integration risks. Overall, these effects will potentially lead to better 
merger outcomes, represented by higher cumulative abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. Since the evidence above from group decision making literature 
and surveys indicate that information exchange increases as the relationship ties grows 
stronger, I expect information exchange to be more efficient and its effects stronger in 
deals involving closely tied individuals as compared to deals with distant ties.  
Familiarity bias hypothesis and information sharing hypothesis are not mutually 
exclusive. They may both be present in a connected deal, acting as opposite forces on 
the success of mergers. The net effect of the two forces will be reflected on 
announcement returns. 
2.2.2 Related Literature 
In the recent years, there has been a growing interest in whether and how the 
existence of personal ties in an M&A context affects the merger process and outcomes. 
A series of studies have examined this question from different angles. A subset of these 
studies focuses on a firm’s connectedness to all other firms in the network via its 
directors and provides evidence that the director network acts as an information channel 
which spreads major corporate financial practices across firms (Stuart and Yim, 2010; 
Bouwman  and Xuan, 2012) and which lowers acquisition-related information 
asymmetries (Singh and Schonlau, 2009). A second subset of studies examines how an 
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agent connecting the acquirer and the target (e.g. a common financial advisor) affects 
merger outcomes and finds that a common agent improves merger performance by 
enhancing information flow but that the information advantage is usually tilted in favor 
of the acquirer (Gompers and Xuan, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; and Agrawal et al., 
2013). A third subset of studies focuses on how a direct link between the target and the 
acquirer affects the probability of these two parties merging. These studies report that 
board interlocks, either historical or contemporaneous, increase the likelihood of 
merging by reducing the information asymmetry between the target and the acquirer 
(Cukurova, 2012a; Rousseau and Stroup, 2013). 
The final subset of studies investigates how direct links between the target and the 
acquirer affect the merger process and performance and hence is most relevant for my 
study. Of the studies in this subset, Ishii and Xuan (2014) and Wu (2011) find a 
negative impact of interpersonal ties on acquirer and combined CARs whereas Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) report a positive impact on acquirer CARs and Renneboog and Zhao 
(2013) report an insignificant impact. A likely explanation for the conflicting evidence 
from these studies is their focus on rather different types of interpersonal ties. Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) study two types of board connections: a “first-degree connection” where 
the target and acquirer have a common director before the deal announcement and a 
“second-degree connection” where a director from each firm are serving on a third 
board. Consistent with the enhanced information exchange hypothesis, both types of 
connections lead to significantly higher acquirer announcement returns. First degree 
connections improve acquirer returns by lowering target premiums while second degree 
connections do so by creating greater combined value, as evidenced by higher 
combined returns. Applying Cai and Sevilir’s (2012) definition of first-degree 
connections to an M&A sample from the UK, Renneboog and Zhao (2013) do not find a 
significant impact of connections on acquirer CARs. They argue that this insignificant 
impact may be due to the failure of information-based benefits of a connection to 
overweigh its costs, such as a “false trust” in the target. Wu (2011) uses a broader 
version of first-degree connections: She identifies an interlock if one person has served 
at both companies as either a director or an officer within the three years prior to deal 
announcement and is still employed by either company in the year right before the 
announcement. Hence this definition covers the first-degree connections of Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) but also allows for interlocks created by officers and for lagged 
interlocks. Inconsistent with the predictions of the enhanced information exchange 
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hypothesis, Wu (2011) finds a negative impact of interlocks on acquirer and combined 
CARs. On the other hand, Ishii and Xuan (2014) define a director or an executive of the 
merging parties as tied if they went to the same school or worked at the same firm in the 
past. They compute a deal-level “average connection” measure by dividing the total 
number of ties between the merging firms’ executives and directors by the maximum 
number of ties that could be present. Consistent with the familiarity bias hypothesis, 
they find that average connection is negatively related to acquirer CARs and combined 
CARs. Although these four studies report inconsistent evidence regarding acquirer and 
combined CARs, they all agree that the impact of connections on target premiums or 
target CARs is insignificant, with the exception of Cai and Sevilir (2012) who report a 
negative impact of first-degree connections. 
In contrast to the prior studies investigating the direct links between the target and 
the acquirer firms, I identify social ties between executives or directors of the two firms 
by reading the merger-related SEC disclosures and the news articles covering the deal. 
This method enables me not to impose any particular channel through which the tie 
could have formed. The individuals could have gotten to know each other by working in 
the same firm, attending the same school, doing business together, becoming acquainted 
in industry shows or in a club or even in the neighborhood. There are no boundaries. 
Another important feature of this method is that it ensures the tie I locate is still active 
at the time of the takeover and is sufficiently material to have played a role in the 
making of the deal. Furthermore, my distinction between close and distant ties allows 
me to observe what effect a further improvement in information sharing has on merger 
outcomes. This paper also contributes to the prior literature by examining the impact of 
social ties on the private takeover process, which starts with the first contact between 
the merging parties and ends with deal announcement. I extract the required data from 
SEC filings and provide evidence on the impact of social ties on the length of the 
private takeover process and the competition involved. 
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2.3 Sample Formation and Data Collection 
2.3.1 Sample Formation 
I identify a set of mergers and acquisitions announced between January 1, 2004 
and December 31, 2008 from U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database of Thomson 
Reuters SDC Platinum. I apply the filters commonly used in the literature that the 
transaction is completed and that the deal value is greater than $5 million. To ensure 
that there is a change-in-control in the target and that the target is entirely owned by the 
acquirer after the deal, I restrict the sample to those deals in which the acquirer owns 
less than 50% of the target when the deal is announced and increases its ownership to 
100% with the deal. I require that both the target and the acquirer be U.S. public firms 
as of the announcement date since I need to calculate announcement returns for both. I 
match the resulting sample to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database and require that both the target and the acquirer are available in CRSP as of the 
announcement date. To have sufficient observations for estimating the market model, I 
keep only the observations in which both firms have at least 100 days of return data in 
the period (-316, -64) prior to deal announcement. I then match the sample to 
Compustat and exclude those deals in which either the target or the acquirer does not 
have financial statement data in the fiscal year just prior to the announcement. These 
filters leave 540 observations. For identifying social ties, I refer to the merger 
documents filed with the SEC by either the target or the acquirer or both. Therefore, I 
drop the 6 deals that do not have a merger document in the EDGAR database. Finally, I 
exclude the 12 deals in which the merging parties have a common director for reasons 
discussed in Section 2.3.2.  
2.3.2 Identification of Social Ties 
To collect the data on social ties, I first refer to the EDGAR filing system of the 
SEC. For each transaction in my sample, I search the EDGAR for the M&A filings by 
the acquirer and/or the target after the deal is announced. The details of the transaction 
are usually found in the documents with the following codes: 
x DEFM14A: Definitive proxy statements relating to merger or acquisition 
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x S-4: Registration of securities, business combinations 
x SC TO-T: Tender offer statement by third party 
x 14D-9: Tender offer solicitation, recommendation statements 
The “Background of the Merger” or “Background of the Offer” sections of these 
documents disclose information on issues such as how and when the merger talks first 
started and how they proceeded, the names of the financial and legal advisors retained, 
the meetings held and decisions taken by the board of directors, contacts made with and 
bids received from other potential bidders, etc. From these background sections, I detect 
whether a tie between the top managers or directors of the merging firms is mentioned 
to be effective in the initiation or the negotiation phase of the merger. Top managers 
include those individuals to whom SEC filings refer to as C-level executives, the 
president, vice presidents or senior managers. For further analyses, I also record some 
other aspects of the merger process: (i) whether the target or the acquirer initiated the 
talks (Masulis and Simsir, 2013), (ii) the number of potential acquirers contacted and 
the number of potential acquirers making private bids (Boone and Mulherin, 2007), (iii) 
the length of the private takeover process (Aktas et al., 2012).  
My second data source for identifying social ties is the Dow Jones Factiva 
database. From this database, I download all the merger-related articles that cite the 
names of both the acquirer and the target. It is not feasible to read the large volume of 
articles about each deal. I make a list of keywords to help me identify the presence of a 
tie between the top management of the two firms. I extract a comprehensive list of 
keywords from the passages in the M&A filings from which I detected a tie. For each 
deal, I search for these keywords in the news articles and after reading the passages 
containing the keywords, I record whether there is indeed a social tie. If needed, I 
expand the initial list of keywords with relevant keywords from the news articles. The 
final list of keywords is provided in Appendix A. 
The procedure outlined above produces 79 connected deals out of the 522 deals 
comprising the sample. A salient difference across these 79 deals is the degree of the 
interpersonal tie. It ranges from professional acquaintances to close friends who have 
known each other for years. Therefore, as a next step, I categorize connected deals into 
two groups based on the closeness of the tie. If the M&A filing or Factiva news states 
that a top manager or director from each firm knows each other very well or that they 
are very familiar with each other, these deals are classified as deals with close ties. 
 19 
Friends or relatives are included in this group, too. I provide below an extract from the 
M&A filing of a deal which I flagged as having a close tie: 
   Francis J. Wiatr, NewMil’s [target] Chairman, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, and James C. Smith, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of Webster [acquirer], have known each other professionally and 
socially for a long period of time and from time to time have had informal 
conversations about the possibility of a merger. During these conversations, 
Mr. Smith had indicated a willingness to initiate discussions regarding a 
possible business combination between Webster and NewMil if NewMil so 
desired.3 
On the other hand, if it is stated that a top manager or director from each firm are 
acquainted or familiar with each other or have worked with each other or are working in 
another firm’s board together but it is not stated that their relationship is close or has 
lasted for many years, I classify the deal as having a distant tie. For instance, due to the 
following statement by Scott Fainor, President and CEO of KNBT Bancorp, during a 
press conference about their acquisition of National Penn Bancshares, I label this deal 
as possessing a distant tie amongst the merging parties: 
   Jorge Leon from National Penn and Carl Kovacs from KNBT will serve as 
co-heads of the merger integration team. I have worked with Jorge at 
Wachovia and Carl at KNBT and have great confidence in their ability to 
provide the leadership necessary to make this integration happen in a 
successful fashion.4 
Deals in which a top manager or director of the target (acquirer) has a previous or 
current business relationship with the acquirer (target) are also categorized as deals with 
a distant tie. For instance, a case in which a director from the acquirer is acquainted 
with the target through his employment at the target’s investment bank would be 
included in this category. Note that cases in which a director from the target and another 
from the acquirer serve in a third firm are also classified as deals with distant ties. Cai 
and Sevilir (2012) call such ties as second degree connections. The difference, here, is 
                                                 
3 See the S-4 form filed with the SEC by Webster Financial Corporation, on June 27, 
2006. 
4  National Penn Bancshares and KNBT Bancorp Agree to Merge – Final (2007, 
September 7) Voxant Fair Disclosure Wire. 
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that I require that the tie is mentioned to have played a role in the private takeover 
process.  
Note also that my social tie definition excludes ties formed by a single person 
serving at both firms during the takeover process. Hence 12 deals with common 
directors between the merging parties are excluded from the sample. The first reason for 
this choice is that, as argued by Rousseau and Stroup (2013), such single-person ties at 
the deal announcement are likely to be plagued with agency conflicts. For instance, if 
the common director also serves as an executive of the acquirer, he may have incentives 
to negotiate a price which favors the acquirer at the expense of the target. However, 
when the tie is between one person from each firm, there is less room for such 
incentives since each person acts in the interest of his own firm (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). 
Hence excluding single-person ties allows for a cleaner analysis of enhanced 
information exchange and familiarity bias hypotheses. The second reason for this choice 
is that my tie identification method which ensures that the tie is actually active at deal 
announcement, does not present any advantage in the case of single-person interlocks. 
The tie is obviously active if it involves only one person. Hence, such an analysis would 
not offer a contribution over the first-degree connection analysis of Cai and Sevilir 
(2012). 
2.3.3 Sample Statistics 
The final sample consists of 522 M&A transactions, out of which 37 are classified 
as deals with close ties and 42 are classified as deals with distant ties. Panel A of Table 
2.1 provides the distribution of deals over the 12 Fama-French industries (Fama and 
French, 1997). In the entire sample, there is a concentration in finance and business 
equipment industries, with 34.7% and 24.7% of the acquirers operating in these two 
industries, respectively. In the following columns, I report the same distribution for the 
subsamples of non-connected deals, connected deals and deals with close and distant 
ties. The industry distribution of these subsamples generally follows the pattern in the 
full sample. Panel B of Table 2.1 presents the distribution of deals over announcement 
years. In the full sample, the number of transactions per year is fairly stable until it 
drops in year 2008, presumably due to the decline in overall capital liquidity as the 
global financial crisis sets in. The subsample of deals with close ties appears to slightly 
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deviate from the trend observed in the full sample. However, it is difficult to suggest a 
systematic reason as to why deals with close ties would be more concentrated in some 
years. In any case, my multivariate regressions include year and industry dummies to 
control for any time and industry trends that may exist. 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for various target, acquirer, and deal 
characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix B. I provide the medians for 
continuous variables and means for discrete variables. The first column presents the 
statistics for the full sample, followed by the four subsamples of non-connected deals, 
connected deals and deals with close and distant ties, respectively. In the subsequent 
four columns, I report the difference between these statistics across different 
subsamples.  
On average, targets in connected deals are larger compared to targets in non-
connected deals. This difference in size is driven by deals with close ties: The median 
target in deals with close ties is four times larger than that in non-connected deals. In 
contrast, there is no significant difference in acquirer sizes across the subsamples. As a 
result, the relative deal size is significantly higher in deals with close ties (68.8%) 
compared to non-connected deals (15.2%). A median relative size of 68.8% in deals 
with close ties implies that these deals are rather crucial investment decisions on the 
part of acquirers.  
The median acquirer has a leverage ratio of 17.4% in connected deals as 
compared to 10.7% in non-connected deals. A higher leverage may force managers to 
be extra vigilant in decision making and hence may enhance decision making (Jensen, 
1986). Indeed,  Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) report that acquirer 
announcement returns increase as acquirer leverage increases.  
Interestingly, both targets and acquirers in connected deals have lower Tobin’s q 
than their counterparts in non-connected deals. The difference is again driven by deals 
with close ties. If q is interpreted as a measure of managerial performance as suggested 
by Servaes (1991), this observation indicates that targets and acquirers in deals with 
close ties perform poorly as compared to those in non-connected deals.  
With regard to deal characteristics, when there is a close or a distant social tie 
between the merging parties, the likelihood of all-equity financing is higher. A tie may 
be leading targets to be more willing to accept the acquirer stock as a medium of 
exchange, by enhancing information on the true value of the acquirer. On the other 
hand, consistent with familiarity bias hypothesis, connected deals are associated with 
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lower competition during the private takeover process. Although 45.1% of targets in 
non-connected deals receive more than one bid, this figure is only 24.1% for targets in 
connected deals. Another interesting finding is that deals with close ties are twice as 
likely to be local deals as non-connected deals.5 This difference is reasonable. It is 
probably easier for individuals to form close ties when they work in the same 
neighborhood. Finally, tender offers are more common in non-connected deals as 
compared to connected deals. 
Connected and non-connected deals significantly differ in terms of various target, 
acquirer, and deal characteristics. I will control for these characteristics in the 
multivariate regression analysis. 
2.4 Social Ties and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In this section, I analyze how a social tie between the target and the acquirer 
affects announcement period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) accruing to the 
hypothetical combined firm and to the target and the acquirer, separately. CARs around 
the date of deal announcement are commonly used in the literature to measure the value 
created with the acquisition. They indicate how successful the shareholders view the 
acquisition. 
I calculate CARs based on the standard event study methodology suggested by 
Brown and Warner (1985). I first estimate the market model for each firm by regressing 
that firm’s daily returns on market returns over the period (-316, -64) relative to deal 
announcement. I use CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns as a proxy for market 
returns and require each firm to have at least 100 days of non-missing return data over 
the estimation period. After estimating the market model parameters, I calculate daily 
abnormal returns of each firm by subtracting the market model predicted daily returns 
from actual daily returns. I reach announcement period CARs by summing up daily 
abnormal returns over the event window, (-t, +t) around the deal announcement date. 
Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), I calculate combined CARs as CARs 
accruing to a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer. The portfolio 
                                                 
5 Following Uysal, Kedia, and Panchapagesan (2008), I define a deal to be local when 
the headquarters of the merging firms are within 100 kilometers of each other. 
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weights are calculated based on each firm’s market value of equity as of the 64th 
trading day before the deal announcement. If the acquirer has a toehold in the target, I 
adjust the target’s weight for this toehold. 
2.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2.3 presents the mean and median values for acquirer CARs, target CARs, 
and combined CARs over the event window (-5, +5). In the first row, I report the 
statistics for the full sample, followed by those for non-connected deals, connected 
deals, and deals with close and distant ties, respectively. In the bottom rows, I compare 
the different subsamples with respect to their CAR values. 
For the full sample, the mean (median) abnormal return for the combined firm is 
1.69% (0.94%) over the period (-5, +5). The average combined CAR is significantly 
greater than zero, implying that an average deal creates value for the two firms as a 
whole. This observation is consistent with the earlier evidence on positive combined 
CARs (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004). 
However, when I divide the sample into two subsamples based on the existence of a 
social tie, it turns out that although mean combined CARs in non-connected deals 
(2.02%) are significantly positive, those in connected deals (-0.18%) are not statistically 
different from zero. Hence, connected deals on average do not create value. This 
evidence is consistent with Ishii and Xuan (2014). Furthermore, the difference between 
connected and non-connected deals mostly stems from deals with distant ties. There is 
no statistically significant difference between deals with close ties and those with no 
ties, in terms of combined CARs. In contrast, a deal with a distant tie has, on average, a 
combined CAR that is 3.62 percentage points lower than that of a non-connected deal. 
This evidence suggests that connected deals lead to lower overall value creation, 
specifically when the social tie is distant.  
A lower average combined CAR in connected deals may arise from a loss 
suffered by acquirer or target shareholders, or both firms’ shareholders. Therefore it is 
necessary to separately analyze how acquirer and target CARs are affected when there 
is a social tie between the two firms. For the full sample, the mean (median) acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return is -1.58% (-1.09%) and is significantly negative. These 
statistics are comparable to Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) who report a mean (median) 
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CAR of -1.48% (-1.19%) for firms acquiring public targets. Irrespective of whether 
there is a social tie between the acquirer and the target, the acquirers lose on average. 
However, their loss is significantly greater when a tie does exist. The mean (median) 
acquirer CAR in non-connected deals is -1.15% (-0.77%) whereas it is -3.98% (-3.91%) 
in connected deals. With regard to acquirer CARs, there is no significant difference 
between deals with close ties and those with distant ties. It appears that the average deal 
in our sample destroys value for acquirer shareholders but significantly more so for 
acquirers in connected deals. This evidence is consistent with Ishii and Xuan (2014) and 
Wu (2011). On the other hand, target shareholders experience a substantial gain in all 
subsamples, regardless of the existence or the degree of a tie. Nevertheless, there is a 
significant difference between connected and non-connected deals: Targets in non-
connected deals obtain a mean (median) CAR of 25.92% (20.26%) whereas their 
counterparts in connected deals experience a mean (median) CAR of 17.97% (16.32%). 
This difference is mainly driven by deals with close ties. Deals with distant ties are not 
significantly different from non-connected deals, in terms of target CARs.  
Overall, the univariate analysis indicates that existence of a social tie results in 
lower target, acquirer, and combined CARs. This evidence may suggest that the 
negative impact of familiarity bias in connected deals outbalances the positive impact of 
enhanced information sharing. Moreover, although distant ties are on average associated 
with lower combined CARs, when the tie is close, average combined CARs are not 
different from those in non-connected deals.  
2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
As reported in Table 2.2 connected deals, especially those with close ties, are 
significantly different than non-connected deals with respect to several target, acquirer 
and deal attributes. Given that these attributes are known to affect CARs, it is necessary 
to control for them in a multivariate setting to check the robustness of the results from 
the univariate analysis. To this end, in this section I will run multivariate regressions 
with combined, acquirer and target CARs as dependent variables, respectively. 
Table 2.4 presents the regressions explaining combined CARs over the period (-5, 
+5). The variables of interest are Any Tie, Close Tie and Distant Tie. Close Tie takes on 
a value of 1 when there is a close tie connecting the directors or top managers of the 
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target and the acquirer, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie is equal to 1 if the social tie(s) 
connecting the two firms is distant and zero otherwise. Finally, Any Tie is set to 1 when 
either Close Tie or Distant Tie is equal to 1. In the first two columns, the only 
explanatory variables are the variables of interest. Then, I add control variables that 
have been shown to influence target or acquirer CARs by prior studies: acquirer size 
(Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), acquisitions in which target and acquirer are 
in the same industry (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990), form of acquisition (Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983), hostility (Schwert, 2000), competition (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 
1988; Boone and Mulherin, 2007), method of payment (Travlos, 1987; Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller, 2002), relative size (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983), Tobin’s q 
(Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991), leverage (Maloney, McCormick, and 
Mitchell, 1993), initiation (Masulis and Simsir, 2013), toehold (Betton and Eckbo, 
2000). I also control for year and industry effects by adding dummies for each of the 12 
Fama French industries and for each announcement year. In the final two columns of 
Table 2.4, I add proxies for target and acquirer performance prior to deal 
announcement. I do not include these variables in the baseline model because they 
reduce the sample size due to a greater frequency of missing observations: As a proxy 
for prior performance, I use buy-and-hold abnormal return over the period (-316, -64) 
and I require that the firm has a complete return series over this period. As an extra 
robustness check, I also include a local deal dummy in these models. Uysal, Kedia, and 
Panchapagesan (2008) find that acquirer returns in local deals are more than twice that 
in non-local deals. Given that the existence of a tie may be correlated with the proximity 
of the two firms, the omission of a control for local deals may lead to inconsistent 
estimates. 
The first two models in Table 2.4, which have no control variables, show that a 
social tie between the target and the acquirer is associated with lower combined CARs, 
and that this effect is driven by deals with distant ties. This observation continues to 
hold in the next 2 columns even after controlling for firm and deal characteristics: 
According to Model (3), a social tie between the firms decreases combined abnormal 
returns by 2.8 percentage points. In contrast to the mean combined CAR of 2.02% in 
non-connected deals, this reduction is economically large. Model (4) shows that the 
existence of a distant tie lowers combined returns by 4 percentage points and this 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the coefficient of Close Tie, 
although negative, is not significantly different from zero. These findings remain 
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unchanged when I include additional control variables in models (5) and (6). Taken 
together, there is evidence of a negative impact of close and distant ties on combined 
abnormal returns, consistent with the familiarity bias hypothesis. This evidence does not 
rule out the possibility that a tie also improves information flow. However, the positive 
impact of better information flow clearly fails to offset the negative impact of 
familiarity bias, in the case of deals with distant ties. Interestingly, when the tie is close, 
its negative impact on combined returns decreases in magnitude and loses significance. 
Consistent with the experimental evidence of Jehn and Shah (1997), who find that 
friendship groups share more information than acquaintance groups, a close tie may 
improve information exchange more so than does a distant tie. In this case, the positive 
impact of information sharing would be greater in deals with close ties and the results 
suggest that this positive impact cancels out the negative effect of the familiarity bias. 
Among the control variables in Table 2.4, hostility, stock payment, relative deal 
size, target prior performance, acquirer and target leverage have strong explanatory 
power for combined CARs in all models. The coefficients of these variables are 
consistent with earlier studies. In line with Schwert (2000) who finds a slightly positive 
effect of SDC-defined hostility on target premiums, I find a positive relation between 
hostility and combined CARs. Payment with acquirer stock turns out to reduce 
combined CARs, in accordance with Travlos (1987) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller 
(2002) who report a negative impact of stock payment on acquirer CARs. Similar to 
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) and Delong (2001), I find that a higher relative 
size improves combined returns. As in Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) who 
find a positive relation between acquirer leverage and acquirer CARs, the coefficient of 
acquirer leverage is positive. This evidence supports the disciplinary effect of debt on 
managers (Jensen, 1986). Finally, similar to Delong (2001), I find that pre-merger 
performance of targets have a negative impact on combined CARs. This result suggests 
that the investors expect the merger to improve the performance of poorly performing 
targets. 
I examine acquirer CARs in Table 2.5. The explanatory variables used in the 
models are identical to those in Table 2.4. The first two models indicate that deals with 
ties have significantly lower acquirer abnormal returns, regardless of the type of the tie. 
When I add control variables in Model (3), the impact of Any Tie remains unaffected. 
When there is a tie between the merging parties, acquirer CARs are lower by 2.4 
percentage points. In Model (4), with the addition of control variables, the coefficient of 
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Close Tie loses its significance. Hence, keeping everything else constant, a close tie 
does not alter acquirer announcement returns. On the other hand, acquirers in deals with 
a distant tie experience abnormal returns that are 3.1 percentage points lower than non-
connected deals. Compared to the mean acquirer CAR of -1.15% in non-connected 
deals, a reduction of 3.1 percentage points is of economic importance. The results are 
robust to the inclusion of prior performance and local deal variables. Overall, the impact 
of ties on acquirer CARs are broadly similar to their impact on combined CARs. Ishii 
and Xuan (2014) and Wu (2011) also find that the acquirers in connected deals 
experience lower abnormal returns. 
Lower acquirer CARs in connected deals may possibly be due to higher premiums 
paid to target shareholders. In that case, ties would merely suggest a wealth transfer 
from acquirer shareholders to target shareholders. To investigate this possibility, I 
examine the target CARs and takeover premiums, in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, respectively. 
Although the first two columns of Table 2.6 indicate that target CARs are lower when 
there is a social tie between the two firms, this effect disappears when I control for firm 
and deal characteristics, in the subsequent columns. Neither deals with close ties nor 
those with distant ties are any different than non-connected deals in terms of target 
shareholder gains. It is possible that the effect of familiarity bias stays limited in this 
case due to the higher shareholder pressure on target managers and directors. Krishnan 
et al. (2012) reports that 10% of all M&A offers result in target shareholder class action 
lawsuits. The threat of a lawsuit may make the target management and target board 
more objective and careful in decision making. The finding that target-acquirer 
connections do not affect target CARs is consistent across all related studies (Ishii and 
Xuan, 2014; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Wu, 2011; and Renneboog and Zhao, 2013), even 
though connection definitions differ considerably.  
Table 2.7 presents the regression explaining premiums paid to targets. The 
dependent variable is defined as the offer price divided by price of target stock 64 
trading days prior to deal announcement minus 1. Here, the existence of a tie does not 
influence premiums paid even in a univariate setting. This evidence is inconsistent with 
a potential agency costs hypothesis, whereby target managers would agree to lower 
premiums to favor their friends in the acquiring firm. 
Taken together, the results in this section imply that when there is a distant tie 
between the two firms, the negative effect of familiarity bias on acquirer CARs appears 
to outbalance the positive effect of improved information exchange. On the other hand, 
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when the tie is close, the information exchange improves further and its greater positive 
effect is able to offset the negative effect of familiarity. As a result, in terms of acquirer 
CARs there is no difference between deals with close ties and non-connected deals. I 
find similar results for combined CARs. However, a tie has no effect on target CARs, 
regardless of its degree. It is possible that the impact of familiarity bias on the target 
firm stays limited due to the litigation threat faced by target managers and directors. 
2.5 Social Ties and the Private Takeover Process 
As I discuss in Section 2.2.1, target – acquirer social ties may be expected to 
affect various other aspects of the private takeover process. Specifically, I predict that 
familiarity bias would reduce the likelihood of competition and that both familiarity 
bias and improved information sharing would shorten the length of the private takeover 
process and lower advisory costs. In this section, I explore whether these predictions 
hold. 
2.5.1 Competition in the Private Takeover Process 
If a firm has the option of merging with another firm with which it has a social tie, 
its directors and top managers may focus on worst-case or at least bad-case scenarios 
when evaluating alternative options involving unfamiliar firms. Due to this skeptical 
approach, target firm managers and directors may fail to consider other potential 
acquirers, leading to reduced competition. These predictions are drawn from the 
familiarity bias model of Cao et al. (2011) as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1.  
Following Boone and Mulherin (2007), I extract competition data from SEC 
M&A filings by counting the number of bidders making a formal bid in the private 
takeover process. Table 2.8 presents the results of the logistic model predicting the 
likelihood of a competitive takeover process. The dependent variable, Competition, is 
set equal to 1 when number of bidders making a formal bid in the private takeover 
process is greater than 1.6 Control variables are taken directly from Boone and Mulherin 
                                                 
6 The results are unchanged if I define Competition as equal to 1 if the number of 
parties contacted by the target firm is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise. 
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(2007) model and are defined in Appendix B. The first model indicates that the 
existence of a social tie between the merging firms significantly decreases the 
likelihood of competing bids. Specifically, when there is a tie, the likelihood of 
competition decreases by around 14%, when the marginal effect is evaluated at the 
medians of the other explanatory variables. Furthermore, Model (2) reveals that this 
effect holds irrespective of the nature of the tie. The coefficients of Distant Tie and 
Close Tie are not significantly different from each other. Hence consistent with the 
familiarity hypothesis, the existence of a close or distant tie is associated with lower 
competition. Controlling for year and industry effects in models (3) and (4) does not 
change the results.  
2.5.2 Length of the Private Takeover Process 
Following Aktas et al. (2012), I define the length of the private takeover process 
as the number of days between the date on which the target and the acquirer first met for 
merger talks and the date the deal was announced. I hand-collect the beginning date of 
the merger talks from the SEC M&A filings. As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, I expect 
familiarity bias to hasten the private takeover process since it causes parties to 
underemphasize due diligence and to spend less time on evaluating alternative merger 
partners. An improved information flow is also expected to shorten the process since it 
may allow the parties to reach an understanding of each other’s intrinsic value at a 
shorter time. Moreover, close ties may be associated with an even shorter negotiation 
process as they are expected to further improve information sharing. 
Table 2.9 presents the results of the regressions explaining the length of the 
private takeover process. In the first two columns, I use the control variables in Aktas et 
al. (2012) since it is the only study available that investigates the duration of the private 
takeover process. In the following two columns, I add several control variables from the 
prior studies which model the duration of the public takeover process, i.e. the time it 
takes to close the deal after the announcement date (Bao and Edmans, 2009; Song, Wei 
and Zhou, 2013; and Walter, Yawson, and Yeung, 2008). The results indicate that the 
existence of a tie decreases the negotiation period by around 25 days. This result is 
consistent with Renneboog and Zhao (2013) who report a negative impact of a common 
director between the target and the acquirer on the length of the public takeover process. 
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Furthermore, Model (2) and Model (4) reveal that the effect is mainly driven by deals 
with close ties. A close tie significantly shortens the private takeover process by 40 
days. Given that it takes 150 days to complete a non-connected deal, a reduction of 40 
days is economically meaningful. On the other hand, a distant tie has a negative but 
insignificant effect. Overall, the results are consistent with the prediction that the private 
takeover process should be shorter in connected deals and that this effect should be 
stronger in deals with close ties by virtue of a more open communication. 
2.5.3 Fees Paid to Financial Advisors 
In this section, I test how a social tie between the target and the acquirer affects 
financial advisory fees paid during the takeover process. I expect both familiarity bias 
and enhanced information exchange hypotheses to lower the reliance on financial 
advisors: On the one hand, when managers’ actions are distorted by familiarity bias, 
they may view themselves as more informed and competent and hence may have a 
tendency to ignore professional advice from investment banks. On the other hand, a 
social tie between the two parties may facilitate information flow and may lower 
parties’ need to refer to investment banks when seeking merger partner candidates or 
when evaluating potential synergy gains resulting from the merger (Cai and Sevilir, 
2012). Again, the negative effect of ties on financial advisory fees is expected to be 
stronger in deals with close ties, which are expected to be associated with a further 
improvement in information flow. 
Table 2.10 presents the results from the regression explaining the advisor fees 
paid by the target during the takeover process. I only investigate the fees paid by targets 
because the data for acquirers is available in SDC only for 91 deals and hence would 
not allow me to reliably distinguish the effects of connected deals over non-connected 
ones. The control variables are taken from Cai and Sevilir (2012). I also add a local deal 
dummy since a local deal is likely to both decrease advisor fees and to increase the 
probability of social ties. In the last two columns, I also add year and industry dummies. 
Holding all else equal, the existence of a tie significantly decreases the target’s financial 
advisory fees by 26%. This result is consistent with that of Cai and Sevilir (2012) who 
find a significantly negative impact of board interlocks on financial advisory fees. Table 
2.10 shows that both close and distant ties have a negative effect on advisory fees but 
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only close ties’ impact is significant. Hence the effect is again driven by deals with 
close ties, lending support for the expectation that deals with close ties should be 
associated with an even lower need for financial advisors. 
2.6 Further Analysis: Social Ties and Likelihood of Director Retention 
Harford (2003) reports that directors of the target firm are rarely retained on the 
board of the combined company following a merger. Furthermore, once the director 
loses his or her board seat in the target, the lost directorship is difficult to be replaced 
with a board seat in another firm, even two years after the completion of the deal. Given 
this evidence, target directors may be tempted to use their social ties with the acquirer 
firm as a means to remain on the combined board. However, directors with close ties to 
the acquirer may be more likely to succeed in remaining on board since they have a 
more friendly relation with the counterparty compared to those with distant ties. To test 
these predictions, I examine in this section whether and how social ties between the 
merging parties affect the overall target board retention and individual target director 
retention, respectively. 
Following Ishii and Xuan (2014), I obtain the last proxy statement filed by the 
target prior to the deal announcement and the first proxy statement filed by the 
combined firm after the completion of the deal. I determine whether each director who 
used to serve on the target board prior to the deal still served on the combined firm’s 
board after the deal’s completion. I construct two measures for target board retention: 
the number of target directors who remain on the board of the combined firm as a 
percentage of target board size and the same number as a percentage of the combined 
firm’s board size. 
The first two columns of Table 2.11 present results of the regression explaining 
the number of target directors retained as a percentage of pre-acquisition target board 
size. The control variables are created based on Ishii and Xuan (2014), Renneboog and 
Zhao (2013) and Harford (2003). I add a local deal dummy since a director may be 
more likely to be retained if s/he works in the neighborhood. I also add a dummy for 
transactions structured as a merger of equals, in which case the targets could ask for a 
higher board representation. The results indicate that the existence of a social tie 
between the merging parties significantly increases the percentage of directors retained 
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by 4.4. This evidence is consistent with Ishii and Xuan (2014) and Renneboog and Zhao 
(2013), who also report a positive impact of interpersonal relations between the merging 
parties on target board retention. Distinguishing between close and distant ties in 
column (2) reveals that the effect is significant only for deals with close ties, which is 
consistent with my expectations. A close tie increases the percentage of target directors 
retained by 10.8. Similar results hold when I define the dependent variable as a 
percentage of the combined board size in the last two columns.  
Table 2.12 presents the results of a logistic regression explaining the likelihood of 
an individual target director being retained on the combined firm’s board. Each 
observation is at the director level and hence there are 3,999 observations in this 
regression. In addition to the control variables used by Ishii and Xuan (2014) to explain 
individual director retention, I add director-level control variables which are used by 
Harford (2003). According to Model (1), a director’s tie to the acquirer does not 
improve his chances of being retained. However, results from Model (2) reveal that a 
close tie with the acquirer significantly increases a director’s likelihood of being 
retained. Having a distant tie, on the other hand, has no significant impact on retention 
likelihood. In the last column, I analyze whether and how a director’s retention 
likelihood is affected when another person from his or her firm is connected to the 
acquirer. I add two dummies, Close (Distant) Tie due to Another Person, which is equal 
to 1 when the target has a close (distant) connection to the acquirer via an individual 
other than that director. It turns out that even if a director is not connected to the 
acquirer himself or herself, his/her likelihood of retention increases if another target 
director or manager is closely connected to the acquirer.  
The director-level control variables in Table 2.12 indicate that a director is 
significantly more likely to be retained if s/he has been at the target board for a longer 
period of time or if s/he is also the CEO of the target and is less likely to be retained if 
s/he has passed the retirement age. Harford (2003) also reports a positive impact of the 
CEO title on the likelihood of being retained in the combined board. 
The coefficients of deal and target-related control variables from Tables 2.11 and 
2.12 also provide some interesting evidence. Results from both tables indicate that a 
higher relative deal size is associated with a higher likelihood of retention. Designing 
the deal as a merger of equals also positively affects retention. These effects are 
reasonable since a higher relative size and a merger of equals transaction increases 
target’s influence on the combined firm. Possibly for the same reason, an all-stock deal 
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is associated with a higher likelihood of target director retention. On the other hand, 
when the acquirer and target operate in different industries, the likelihood of target 
director retention is lower probably because target directors may be less valuable in a 
different industry. Consistent with my expectations, when the headquarters of the target 
and acquirer are within 100 kilometers of each other, the likelihood of retention 
increases. 
Overall, although a close tie does not affect merger outcomes for the target or 
acquirer shareholders, the results from Tables 2.11 and 2.12 suggest it does improve 
merger outcomes for target directors by increasing their retention probability. On the 
other hand, it appears that a distant tie is not close enough to generate private benefits 
for the person in the relationship or his/her colleagues. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This paper examines how a social tie connecting the two parties of an M&A deal 
affects merger outcomes. I identify the existence of social ties from merger-related SEC 
filings and news sources and I make a further distinction based on the degree of the 
social tie. My identification method frees the social tie definition from any particular 
route through which the tie could have been formed and ensures that the tie is still 
active during the making of the deal. Overall, my results suggest that social ties between 
executives or directors of target and acquirer firms lead to lower value creation for 
acquirer shareholders and the shareholders overall. A closer look reveals that deals with 
distant ties drive this adverse effect. In deals with distant ties, the effects of familiarity 
bias clearly dominate any positive information-based effect. The lower competition 
observed in these deals implies a failure to consider better alternatives outside the 
network and is a potential source for poorer outcomes. On the other hand, close ties do 
not significantly affect merger performance, implying that these ties further improve 
information exchange, enabling its positive effects to offset the negative effect of the 
familiarity bias. Interestingly, although close ties do not affect merger outcomes for the 
shareholders, such ties do improve merger outcomes for target directors by increasing 
their retention probability. I also document that connected deals are associated with 
lower financial advisory fees paid by the target and a shorter private takeover process, 
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as compared to non-connected deals. However, these effects are stronger in deals with 
close ties, possibly due to a further improvement in information flow. 
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2.8 Tables 
Table 2.1 Sample distribution 
 
This table presents the frequency distribution of 522 M&A transactions between U.S. public firms announced in the period from 2004 to 2008. Each deal is 
completed and has a value of at least $5 million. The acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the deal and owns 100% of it after the deal. Both the 
target and acquirer are covered by CRSP and Compustat. For each deal, there is a deal-related SEC filing available at EDGAR. Panel A and B provide the 
distribution of deals by acquirer industry and announcement year, respectively. The first column reports the numbers for the entire sample, followed by the 
four subsamples of non-connected deals, connected deals and deals with close and distant ties, respectively. A deal is classified as connected if the merger-
related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target. Each 
connected deal is further classified as a deal with a close or a distant tie based on the degree of the social tie connecting the two parties. The acquirer’s 
industry is defined by the Fama-French 12-industry categories. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel A: By acquirer industry 
  
Full sample Non-connected deals Connected deals Close Tie Distant Tie 
FF12 industry of the acquirer Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Consumer NonDurables 14 2.7% 13 2.9% 1 1.3% 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 
Consumer Durables 2 0.4% 1 0.2% 1 1.3% 0 0.0% 1 2.4% 
Manufacturing 27 5.2% 26 5.9% 1 1.3% 0 0.0% 1 2.4% 
Energy 16 3.1% 12 2.7% 4 5.1% 3 8.1% 1 2.4% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 10 1.9% 9 2.0% 1 1.3% 0 0.0% 1 2.4% 
Business Equipment 129 24.7% 118 26.6% 11 13.9% 4 10.8% 7 16.7% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 20 3.8% 14 3.2% 6 7.6% 2 5.4% 4 9.5% 
Utilities 5 1.0% 4 0.9% 1 1.3% 1 2.7% 0 0.0% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 26 5.0% 19 4.3% 7 8.9% 3 8.1% 4 9.5% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 61 11.7% 55 12.4% 6 7.6% 2 5.4% 4 9.5% 
Finance 181 34.7% 145 32.7% 36 45.6% 18 48.6% 18 42.9% 
Other 31 5.9% 27 6.1% 4 5.1% 3 8.1% 1 2.4% 
Total 522 100.0% 443 100.0% 79 100.0% 37 100.0% 42 100.0% 
                      
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: By announcement year 
 
  
Full sample Non-connected deals Connected deals Close tie Distant tie 
Deal announcement year Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2004 127 24.3% 104 23.5% 23 29.1% 13 35.1% 10 23.8% 
2005 106 20.3% 92 20.8% 14 17.7% 5 13.5% 9 21.4% 
2006 109 20.9% 90 20.3% 19 24.1% 13 35.1% 6 14.3% 
2007 105 20.1% 92 20.8% 13 16.5% 2 5.4% 11 26.2% 
2008 75 14.4% 65 14.7% 10 12.7% 4 10.8% 6 14.3% 
Total 522 100.0% 443 100.0% 79 100.0% 37 100.0% 42 100.0% 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of 522 M&A transactions between U.S. public firms announced in the period from 2004 to 2008. Medians are 
provided for continuous variables and means for discrete variables. Each deal is completed and has a value of at least $5 million. The acquirer owns less than 
50% of the target before the deal and owns 100% of it after the deal. Both the target and acquirer are covered by CRSP and Compustat. For each deal, there is 
a deal-related SEC filing available at EDGAR. The first column reports the numbers for the entire sample, followed by the four subsamples of non-connected 
deals, connected deals and deals with close and distant ties, respectively. The subsequent four columns report the difference between the statistics across the 
different subsamples. A deal is classified as connected if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie 
between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target. Each connected deal is further classified as a deal with a close or a distant tie based on 
the degree of the social tie connecting the two parties. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
 
  
(I) 
Full 
sample 
(II) 
Non-
connected 
deals 
(III) 
Connected 
Deals 
(IV) 
Close 
Ties 
(V) 
Distant 
Ties 
(III)-(II) 
Connected -  
Non-connected 
(IV)-(II) 
Close Ties -  
Non-connected 
(V)-(II) 
Distant Ties -  
Non-
connected 
(V)-(IV) 
Distant Ties - 
Close Ties 
No of 
Obs. 
Target related                             
Firm size ($ mil) 305.207 278.375 489.836 1,152.034 354.651 211.461 *** 873.659 *** 76.276   -797.383 ** 522 
Tobin's q 1.427 1.455 1.293 1.144 1.388 -0.161 * -0.310 ** -0.067   0.243   520 
Leverage 0.085 0.075 0.155 0.188 0.122 0.080 *** 0.113 *** 0.047   -0.066 *** 519 
Adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.077 -0.074 -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 -0.015   -0.015   -0.015   0.001   497 
Acquirer related                             
Firm size ($ mil) 3,156.506 3,192.092 2,863.130 2,653.192 3,888.645 -328.962   -538.900   696.553   1,235.453   522 
Tobin's q 1.477 1.537 1.247 1.234 1.252 -0.290 *** -0.303 *** -0.285 * 0.018   521 
Leverage 0.113 0.107 0.174 0.184 0.155 0.066 *** 0.077 *** 0.048   -0.029   516 
Adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.004 -0.001 -0.020 0.011 -0.049 -0.019   0.011   -0.048 ** -0.060 ** 507 
  (Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
  
(I) 
Full 
sample 
(II) 
Non-
connected 
deals 
(III) 
Connected 
Deals 
(IV) 
Close 
Ties 
(V) 
Distant 
Ties 
(III)-(II) 
Connected -  
Non-connected 
(IV)-(II) 
Close Ties -  
Non-connected 
(V)-(II) 
Distant Ties -  
Non-connected 
(V)-(IV) 
Distant Ties - 
Close Ties 
No of 
Obs. 
Deal characteristics                             
All stock 0.220 0.185 0.418 0.324 0.500 0.233 *** 0.139 ** 0.315 *** 0.176   522 
Relative size 0.175 0.152 0.380 0.688 0.199 0.228 *** 0.536 *** 0.048   -0.489 *** 522 
Tender offer 0.102 0.113 0.038 0.027 0.048 -0.075 ** -0.086   -0.065   0.021   522 
Hostile 0.031 0.032 0.025 0.054 0.000 -0.006   0.022   -0.032   -0.054   522 
Competition 0.420 0.451 0.241 0.243 0.238 -0.211 *** -0.208 ** -0.213 *** -0.005   522 
Diversifying 0.238 0.246 0.190 0.135 0.238 -0.056   -0.111   -0.008   0.103   522 
Buyer initiated 0.531 0.544 0.456 0.432 0.476 -0.088   -0.112   -0.068   0.044   522 
Local 0.243 0.224 0.346 0.444 0.262 0.122 ** 0.220 *** 0.037   -0.183 * 519 
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Table 2.3 Univariate CAR analysis 
 
This table presents the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for a combined portfolio of the target and acquirer (CCAR), for the acquirer (ACAR), 
and for the target (TCAR) over the period (-5, +5) relative to deal announcement date for the sample of 522 completed M&A transactions. Each deal is 
announced in the period from 2004 to 2008 and has a value of at least $5 million. The acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the deal and owns 
100% of it after the deal. Both the target and acquirer are U.S. public firms covered by CRSP and Compustat. For each deal, there is a deal-related SEC filing 
available at EDGAR. The first row reports the statistics for the full sample, followed by those for non-connected deals, connected deals, and deals with close 
and distant ties, respectively. The four bottom rows report the difference between the statistics across the different subsamples. A deal is classified as 
connected if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the 
acquirer and the target. Each connected deal is further classified as a deal with a close or a distant tie based on the degree of the social tie connecting the two 
parties. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
      Means   Medians 
  n   CCAR   ACAR   TCAR   CCAR   ACAR   TCAR 
(I) Full Sample 522   1.69 ***   -1.58 ***   24.72 ***   0.94 ***   -1.09 ***   19.92 *** 
(II) Non-Connected Deals 443   2.02 ***   -1.15 ***   25.92 ***   1.11 ***   -0.77 ***   20.26 *** 
(III) Connected Deals 79   -0.18     -3.98 ***   17.97 ***   -0.31     -3.91 ***   16.32 *** 
(IV) Close Ties 37   1.42     -3.55 ***   16.19 ***   0.09     -4.24 ***   16.32 *** 
(V) Distant Ties 42   -1.60     -4.35 ***   19.53 ***   -1.23     -2.52 ***   16.26 *** 
                                        
                                        
Connected - Non-Connected     -2.21 **   -2.82 ***   -7.96 **   -1.43 **   -3.14 ***   -3.94 ** 
Close Ties - Non-Connected     -0.60     -2.39 *   -9.73 *   -1.02     -3.47 ***   -3.94 ** 
Distant Ties - Non-Connected     -3.62 ***   -3.20 **   -6.39     -2.35 ***   -1.75 **   -4.00   
Distant Ties - Close Ties     -3.02 *   -0.80     3.34     -1.33     1.72     -0.06   
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Table 2.4 Multivariate analysis of combined cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the combined entity (CCAR): the dependent variable is 
calculated as the abnormal returns accruing to a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer over the event window (-5, +5), with portfolio weights 
based on each firm’s market value of equity as of the 64th trading day before the deal announcement. Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the 
target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value of one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or 
are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not 
close, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any tie -0.022**   -0.028***   -0.026**   
  (-2.386)   (-2.932)   (-2.497)   
Close tie   -0.006   -0.014   -0.010 
    (-0.535)   (-1.235)   (-0.886) 
Distant tie   -0.036***   -0.040***   -0.039*** 
    (-2.799)   (-3.070)   (-2.734) 
ln(Acquirer size)     -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
      (-0.795) (-0.893) (-0.950) (-1.019) 
Diversifying deal     -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
      (-0.691) (-0.680) (-0.828) (-0.841) 
Tender offer     0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003 
      (0.121) (0.078) (0.290) (0.225) 
Hostile deal     0.064** 0.063** 0.064** 0.062** 
      (2.526) (2.474) (2.277) (2.218) 
Competition     -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
      (-1.287) (-1.306) (-1.399) (-1.398) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any stock payment     -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
      (-4.388) (-4.440) (-4.370) (-4.403) 
ln(Relative size)     0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
      (3.174) (3.030) (2.726) (2.635) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
      (0.513) (0.556) (0.415) (0.481) 
Acquirer leverage     0.087*** 0.088*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
      (2.662) (2.680) (2.975) (2.951) 
Target Tobin's Q     -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
      (-0.416) (-0.383) (0.284) (0.306) 
Target leverage     -0.047* -0.050* -0.047* -0.049* 
      (-1.829) (-1.939) (-1.737) (-1.829) 
Toehold     0.007 0.008 0.013 0.015 
      (0.108) (0.137) (0.182) (0.212) 
Buyer initiated     0.003 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
      (0.480) (0.509) (-0.055) (-0.020) 
Acquirer adjusted return (-316, -64)         0.005 0.004 
          (0.353) (0.284) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64)         -0.027*** -0.027*** 
          (-2.893) (-2.854) 
Local deal         -0.001 -0.002 
          (-0.155) (-0.238) 
Constant 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
  (5.133) (5.128) (2.620) (2.680) (2.923) (2.970) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.00741 0.0106 0.137 0.139 0.145 0.148 
Sample size 522 522 513 513 474 474 
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Table 2.5 Multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns: the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns accruing 
to the acquirer over the event window (-5, +5). Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report 
the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value 
of one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. 
Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any tie -0.028***   -0.024**   -0.025**   
  (-3.211)   (-2.569)   (-2.389)   
Close tie   -0.024**   -0.016   -0.016 
    (-2.275)   (-1.368)   (-1.287) 
Distant tie   -0.032**   -0.031**   -0.032** 
    (-2.536)   (-2.481)   (-2.303) 
ln(Acquirer size)     -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
      (-0.609) (-0.670) (-0.641) (-0.685) 
Diversifying deal     0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.145) (0.151) (-0.094) (-0.102) 
Tender offer     -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
      (-0.799) (-0.821) (-0.699) (-0.736) 
Hostile deal     0.024 0.023 0.020 0.019 
      (1.496) (1.461) (1.225) (1.185) 
Competition     -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
      (-1.106) (-1.119) (-0.921) (-0.923) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any stock payment     -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041*** 
      (-4.199) (-4.233) (-4.030) (-4.049) 
ln(Relative size)     -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
      (-1.332) (-1.391) (-1.315) (-1.356) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q     0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 
      (0.472) (0.495) (0.785) (0.819) 
Acquirer leverage     0.090** 0.091** 0.104** 0.103** 
      (2.267) (2.281) (2.428) (2.416) 
Target Tobin's Q     0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
      (0.162) (0.191) (-0.067) (-0.055) 
Target leverage     -0.033 -0.035 -0.038 -0.039 
      (-1.215) (-1.279) (-1.299) (-1.355) 
Toehold     -0.030 -0.029 -0.034 -0.033 
      (-1.371) (-1.311) (-1.595) (-1.522) 
Buyer initiated     0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
      (0.310) (0.324) (0.267) (0.286) 
Acquirer adjusted return (-316, -64)         -0.001 -0.001 
          (-0.061) (-0.101) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64)         -0.013 -0.013 
          (-1.392) (-1.367) 
Local deal         0.002 0.002 
          (0.233) (0.194) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.043 0.044 0.047 0.048 
  (-2.896) (-2.894) (1.170) (1.187) (1.258) (1.267) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.0132 0.0116 0.0957 0.0951 0.0901 0.0894 
Sample size 522 522 513 513 474 474 
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Table 2.6 Multivariate analysis of target cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for target cumulative abnormal returns: the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to 
the target over the event window (-5, +5). Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the 
existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value of 
one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. 
Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any tie -0.080***   -0.005   -0.013   
  (-3.177)   (-0.216)   (-0.493)   
Close tie   -0.097***   0.024   0.023 
    (-3.350)   (0.917)   (0.887) 
Distant tie   -0.064*   -0.028   -0.040 
    (-1.844)   (-0.790)   (-1.081) 
ln(Target size)     -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.022** -0.022** 
      (-2.587) (-2.622) (-2.325) (-2.355) 
Diversifying deal     -0.041 -0.041 -0.049* -0.049* 
      (-1.551) (-1.542) (-1.814) (-1.815) 
Tender offer     0.039 0.039 0.041 0.039 
      (0.685) (0.675) (0.692) (0.668) 
Hostile deal     -0.032 -0.035 -0.013 -0.017 
      (-0.588) (-0.651) (-0.230) (-0.306) 
Competition     -0.047* -0.048* -0.054* -0.054* 
      (-1.763) (-1.777) (-1.924) (-1.934) 
Any stock payment     -0.057* -0.058* -0.053* -0.054* 
      (-1.914) (-1.949) (-1.715) (-1.738) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(Relative size)     -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.045*** 
      (-4.088) (-4.110) (-4.199) (-4.229) 
Target Tobin's Q     -0.025* -0.024* -0.023 -0.022 
      (-1.749) (-1.732) (-1.285) (-1.273) 
Target leverage     0.062 0.055 0.067 0.060 
      (0.553) (0.490) (0.594) (0.529) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q     0.023* 0.024* 0.017 0.017 
      (1.715) (1.739) (1.144) (1.182) 
Acquirer leverage     -0.048 -0.046 -0.013 -0.014 
      (-0.574) (-0.548) (-0.148) (-0.160) 
Toehold     -0.091 -0.087 -0.028 -0.023 
      (-1.039) (-0.985) (-0.392) (-0.318) 
Buyer initiated     0.003 0.003 -0.013 -0.012 
      (0.110) (0.122) (-0.492) (-0.474) 
Acquirer adjusted return (-316, -64)         0.005 0.003 
          (0.177) (0.097) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64)         -0.097*** -0.096*** 
          (-3.328) (-3.298) 
Local deal         0.010 0.009 
          (0.365) (0.316) 
Constant 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.357*** 0.359*** 0.385*** 0.386*** 
  (18.317) (18.299) (4.404) (4.421) (4.544) (4.549) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.00814 0.00675 0.227 0.227 0.266 0.266 
Sample size 522 522 513 513 474 474 
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Table 2.7 Multivariate analysis of takeover premiums 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for takeover premiums: the dependent variable is the offer price divided by the price of the target stock 64 
trading days prior to deal announcement minus 1. Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report 
the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value 
of one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. 
Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any tie -0.040   0.034   0.037   
  (-0.915)   (0.834)   (0.875)   
Close tie   -0.059   0.040   0.030 
    (-1.296)   (0.857)   (0.677) 
Distant tie   -0.023   0.030   0.042 
    (-0.340)   (0.500)   (0.686) 
ln(Target size)     -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
      (-3.568) (-3.561) (-3.287) (-3.257) 
Diversifying deal     -0.043 -0.043 -0.046 -0.046 
      (-1.211) (-1.208) (-1.266) (-1.265) 
Tender offer     0.091 0.091 0.095 0.095 
      (1.265) (1.263) (1.315) (1.318) 
Hostile deal     -0.012 -0.013 -0.004 -0.003 
      (-0.189) (-0.199) (-0.062) (-0.049) 
Competition     0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
      (0.035) (0.031) (0.011) (0.014) 
Any stock payment     -0.032 -0.032 -0.038 -0.038 
      (-0.869) (-0.868) (-0.968) (-0.959) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(Relative size)     -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 
      (-1.047) (-1.054) (-1.127) (-1.123) 
Target Tobin's Q     -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 
      (-0.558) (-0.552) (-0.144) (-0.146) 
Target leverage     0.204 0.202 0.215 0.216 
      (0.937) (0.926) (0.960) (0.962) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q     -0.009 -0.009 -0.023 -0.023 
      (-0.456) (-0.451) (-0.976) (-0.984) 
Acquirer leverage     -0.313** -0.312** -0.269* -0.269* 
      (-2.118) (-2.106) (-1.713) (-1.714) 
Toehold     -0.093 -0.093 -0.044 -0.045 
      (-0.893) (-0.882) (-0.422) (-0.429) 
Buyer initiated     0.075** 0.075** 0.057* 0.057* 
      (2.312) (2.312) (1.667) (1.665) 
Acquirer adjusted return (-316, -64)         0.034 0.035 
          (0.688) (0.695) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64)         -0.064 -0.064 
          (-1.571) (-1.570) 
Local deal         0.007 0.007 
          (0.204) (0.213) 
Constant 0.341*** 0.341*** 0.700*** 0.701*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 
  (21.146) (21.125) (6.643) (6.633) (6.579) (6.569) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 -0.000153 -0.00170 0.147 0.145 0.151 0.149 
Sample size 508 508 499 499 460 460 
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Table 2.8 Determinants of competition in the private takeover process 
 
This table reports the results of logistic models designed to estimate the probability of a 
competitive private takeover process: the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the number of 
parties that made a formal bid for the target in the private takeover process exceeds one, and 
zero otherwise. Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related M&A 
filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top 
executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value of 
one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are 
friends or are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie takes on the value 
of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies 
are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any tie -0.919***   -1.029***   
  (-3.091)   (-3.411)   
Close tie   -0.826**   -0.902** 
    (-2.024)   (-2.043) 
Distant tie   -0.992**   -1.126*** 
    (-2.499)   (-2.930) 
ln(Relative size) -0.028 -0.030 -0.028 -0.030 
  (-0.451) (-0.469) (-0.415) (-0.439) 
Target size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.524) (-1.524) (-1.610) (-1.612) 
All cash payment 0.770*** 0.773*** 0.759*** 0.762*** 
  (3.334) (3.341) (3.156) (3.169) 
Tender offer 0.361 0.360 -0.039 -0.043 
  (1.120) (1.114) (-0.111) (-0.122) 
Buyer initiated -0.754*** -0.753*** -0.797*** -0.795*** 
  (-3.924) (-3.922) (-3.949) (-3.936) 
Target in regulated ind. 0.648** 0.648** 1.034 1.034 
  (2.574) (2.573) (1.570) (1.568) 
Toehold -0.291 -0.289 -0.396 -0.392 
  (-0.435) (-0.432) (-0.603) (-0.596) 
Target idiosyncratic vol. -14.325 -14.227 -19.066* -18.900* 
  (-1.604) (-1.588) (-1.897) (-1.875) 
Constant 0.002 -0.004 -0.589 -0.599 
  (0.006) (-0.012) (-0.821) (-0.835) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.0858 0.0859 0.114 0.114 
Sample size 522 522 522 522 
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Table 2.9 Determinants of the length of the private takeover process 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for the length of the private takeover process: 
the dependent variable is defined as the number of days between the date on which the target 
and the acquirer first met for merger talks and the date the deal was announced. Any Tie is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report 
the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer 
and the target, and zero otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value of one if it is stated that the 
connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or are very familiar 
with each other, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie 
between the two parties but the tie is not close, and zero otherwise. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any tie -25.479*   -22.791*   
  (-1.959)   (-1.669)   
Close tie   -41.697**   -38.373** 
    (-2.305)   (-2.189) 
Distant tie   -11.947   -9.890 
    (-0.705)   (-0.540) 
ln(# of target industries) 5.207 5.751 8.198 8.753 
  (0.617) (0.676) (0.934) (0.985) 
Seller initiated -27.219** -27.482** -32.140*** -32.325*** 
  (-2.459) (-2.488) (-2.594) (-2.612) 
Acquirer in regulated ind. 4.304 5.774 13.745 15.386 
  (0.167) (0.223) (0.498) (0.553) 
Acquirer pre-3years no of deals -2.739 -2.803 -1.029 -1.142 
  (-0.971) (-0.994) (-0.360) (-0.400) 
Acquirer leverage -48.452 -46.879 -32.215 -30.877 
  (-1.087) (-1.040) (-0.705) (-0.670) 
Relative size 21.710*** 21.825*** 18.083** 17.617** 
  (2.928) (3.043) (2.293) (2.263) 
ln(Deal value)     -13.096*** -12.941*** 
      (-3.188) (-3.143) 
Percentage stock     0.153 0.154 
      (0.896) (0.904) 
Tender offer     3.110 3.182 
      (0.152) (0.156) 
Hostile deal     -74.996*** -73.778*** 
      (-2.818) (-2.776) 
Number of T&A advisors     14.110** 14.784** 
      (1.991) (2.103) 
Diversifying deal     -17.878 -18.501 
      (-1.240) (-1.276) 
Competition     -0.909 -0.686 
      (-0.074) (-0.056) 
 (Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 139.625*** 138.218*** 160.190*** 156.534*** 
  (5.034) (4.951) (4.586) (4.451) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.0235 0.0239 0.0501 0.0502 
Sample size 514 514 507 507 
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Table 2.10 Determinants of advisory fees paid by targets 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for the financial advisory fees paid by the 
target: the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the inflation adjusted financial 
advisory fees paid by the target. Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie 
between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero otherwise. Close 
Tie takes on the value of one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very 
well or that they are friends or are very familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie 
takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, 
and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and 
industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-
adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Any tie -0.308**   -0.259*   
  (-2.167)   (-1.864)   
Close tie   -0.453*   -0.455* 
    (-1.682)   (-1.684) 
Distant tie   -0.205   -0.120 
    (-1.456)   (-0.917) 
ln(Deal value) 0.703*** 0.707*** 0.700*** 0.705*** 
  (23.967) (24.156) (21.662) (22.000) 
ln(Acquirer size) 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.031 
  (1.308) (1.291) (1.077) (1.062) 
Any stock payment -0.213** -0.206** -0.165 -0.151 
  (-2.365) (-2.328) (-1.592) (-1.501) 
Diversifying deal 0.093 0.089 0.096 0.089 
  (1.036) (0.994) (0.928) (0.878) 
Tender offer 0.178* 0.179* -0.039 -0.033 
  (1.721) (1.739) (-0.343) (-0.292) 
Hostile deal 0.377** 0.413** 0.325** 0.372* 
  (2.315) (2.324) (1.981) (1.957) 
Target pre-3years no of deals -0.055 -0.054 -0.041 -0.041 
  (-1.193) (-1.135) (-0.885) (-0.827) 
Local deal -0.045 -0.037 -0.057 -0.046 
  (-0.422) (-0.369) (-0.502) (-0.433) 
Constant -3.247*** -3.272*** -3.355*** -3.392*** 
  (-12.073) (-12.988) (-10.399) (-11.367) 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.703 0.703 0.718 0.719 
Sample size 387 387 387 387 
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Table 2.11 Determinants of target board retention 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for the percentage of target directors retained.  In the first two columns, the dependent variable is the number 
of target directors who remain on the board of the combined firm as a percentage of pre-acquisition target board size. In the subsequent columns, the 
dependent variable is the same number as a percentage of combined firm board size. Any Tie is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the merger-related 
M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, and zero 
otherwise. Close Tie takes on the value of one if it is stated that the connected individuals know each other very well or that they are friends or are very 
familiar with each other, and zero otherwise. Distant Tie takes on the value of one if there is a social tie between the two parties but the tie is not close, and 
zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics 
based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Target directors retained  (% of target board) 
Target directors retained  
(% of target board) 
Target directors retained  
(% combined  board) 
Target directors retained  
(% combined  board) 
Any tie 0.044**   0.026*   
  (2.018)   (1.733)   
Close tie   0.108***   0.071*** 
    (2.987)   (2.904) 
Distant tie   -0.010   -0.012 
    (-0.410)   (-0.691) 
ln(Target size) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.488) (-0.475) (-0.221) (-0.201) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.008** 0.009** 0.007** 0.008** 
  (1.968) (2.153) (2.249) (2.475) 
Target leverage 0.020 0.005 0.030 0.020 
  (0.539) (0.145) (1.061) (0.741) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 
  (-0.359) (-0.305) (-0.985) (-0.949) 
Relative size 0.057** 0.058** 0.045** 0.045*** 
  (2.225) (2.422) (2.469) (2.678) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.11 (Continued) 
Dependent variable: Target directors retained  (% of target board) 
Target directors retained  
(% of target board) 
Target directors retained  
(% combined  board) 
Target directors retained  
(% combined  board) 
All stock payment 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 
  (3.072) (3.392) (3.447) (3.773) 
Diversifying deal -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.019** -0.019** 
  (-2.637) (-2.642) (-2.513) (-2.520) 
Tender offer -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.029*** 
  (-2.602) (-2.618) (-3.261) (-3.247) 
Hostile deal 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.157) (-0.066) (-0.143) (-0.406) 
Competition -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012 
  (-1.420) (-1.451) (-1.427) (-1.453) 
Local deal 0.041** 0.036** 0.033*** 0.029** 
  (2.577) (2.330) (2.837) (2.567) 
Target board tenure 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (0.740) (0.687) (0.375) (0.307) 
Target board outside director % 0.178*** 0.181*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 
  (3.273) (3.414) (4.839) (4.928) 
Target board other directorships 0.014 0.009 0.006 0.002 
  (1.202) (0.759) (0.652) (0.187) 
Merger of equals 0.572*** 0.562*** 0.382*** 0.375*** 
  (12.228) (11.746) (19.345) (18.524) 
Constant -0.177*** -0.178*** -0.182*** -0.182*** 
  (-2.985) (-3.061) (-3.914) (-3.957) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.496 0.512 0.488 0.503 
Sample size 479 479 479 479 
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Table 2.12 Determinants of individual target director retention 
 
This table reports the results of logistic models designed to estimate the likelihood of individual 
target director retention: the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the target director remains on the 
board of the combined firm, and zero otherwise. Director with a tie takes on the value of one if 
the director is connected to a director or executive of the acquirer, and zero otherwise. Director 
with a close (distant) tie takes on the value of one if the director has a close (distant) tie with a 
director or executive of the acquirer, and zero otherwise. Close (distant) tie due to another 
person takes on the value of one if the target has a close (distant) tie to the acquirer via an 
individual other than the current director. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The 
coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. In parentheses are t-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Director with a tie 0.530     
  (1.448)     
Director with a close tie   0.874* 1.053** 
    (1.960) (2.389) 
Close tie due to another person     0.862*** 
      (4.532) 
Director with a distant tie   0.060 0.107 
    (0.100) (0.176) 
Distant tie due to another person     -0.166 
      (-0.677) 
Director tenure 0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 
  (1.778) (1.762) (1.747) 
Director passed retirement age -0.733*** -0.737*** -0.786*** 
  (-3.925) (-3.944) (-4.188) 
Director is CEO 0.751*** 0.751*** 0.798*** 
  (4.292) (4.285) (4.512) 
ln(Target size) 0.097** 0.096** 0.068* 
  (2.407) (2.386) (1.685) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.042 0.043 0.067 
  (0.672) (0.697) (1.144) 
Target leverage 0.322 0.306 0.255 
  (0.670) (0.637) (0.537) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.279 -0.280 -0.249 
  (-1.563) (-1.563) (-1.402) 
Relative size 0.506*** 0.513*** 0.535*** 
  (5.731) (5.845) (6.056) 
All stock payment 0.651*** 0.660*** 0.690*** 
  (4.578) (4.646) (4.654) 
Diversifying deal -0.714*** -0.711*** -0.745*** 
  (-2.922) (-2.904) (-3.034) 
Tender offer -2.571** -2.568** -2.563** 
  (-2.495) (-2.492) (-2.486) 
Hostile deal -0.026 -0.047 -0.214 
  (-0.055) (-0.101) (-0.449) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 2.12 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Competition -0.395*** -0.391** -0.305** 
  (-2.585) (-2.564) (-1.987) 
Local deal 0.668*** 0.663*** 0.571*** 
  (4.924) (4.886) (4.096) 
Merger of equals 3.255*** 3.243*** 3.185*** 
  (9.338) (9.318) (9.275) 
Constant -4.934*** -4.948*** -4.889*** 
  (-7.117) (-7.129) (-7.163) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.227 0.228 0.236 
Sample size 3,999 3,999 3,999 
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BOARD INVOLVEMENT IN THE M&A NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
   “If a company is running along smoothly, then it’s advice and counsel 
that directors are called upon to give, but if there is some sort of crisis, then 
a director will have to devote far more time to study all of the ramifications 
of the issue in order to be able to make the right decision. In the case of a 
takeover, you have to meet constantly in order to fulfill your fiduciary 
responsibilities, or else you may be liable at some future date.” 
Comment by a board director 
- quoted from Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
The potential takeover of a company has always been one of the most 
controversial corporate events since it leads to a sharp divergence between shareholder 
and management interests. While the shareholders’ main concern during the sale of their 
company is the offer price, the energies of the CEOs are also directed to plan their 
careers for the post-takeover period. This conflict of interest sets the basis for CEOs 
trading off their own benefits with those of shareholders when negotiating the sale of 
the company (Wulf, 2004; Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 2004; Brewer, Jackson and 
Wall, 2006; Fich, Cai and Tran, 2011; and Qui, Trapkov and Yakoub, 2014). In this 
setting of heightened agency conflicts, it falls on the target board to protect shareholder 
interests by closely monitoring the sale process, which is typically led by the CEO. 
Besides this demanding monitoring role, the board is also expected to serve as an 
advisor and guide the management through the complex sale process. The above 
quotation, made by a board member interviewed by Lorsch and MacIver (1989), clearly 
illustrates how strongly the directors feel the pressure of these heightened expectations, 
which, if not fulfilled, may lead to shareholder lawsuits.  
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Krishnan et al. (2012) report that approximately 10% of all M&A offers are 
followed by shareholder litigations against target firm executives and directors. Under 
the business judgment rule, the U.S. courts evaluate the adequacy of the board’s 
decision-making process rather than the final outcome of the deal. Hence they refrain 
from imposing a single blueprint of the steps to be followed by the target board so as to 
comply with its fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, an analysis of litigation materials reveals 
that there is a set of red flags that are raised while investigating whether the target board 
has breached its duties during the takeover process. These red flags include: (i) not 
conducting an adequate auction process and/or limiting the firm’s ability to receive 
future bids, (ii) not obtaining a fairness opinion, (iii) holding only a few board meetings 
before approving the sale or (iv) failing to get involved early in the sale process. While 
the first point has been studied by Boone and Mulherin (2007), Officer (2003) and 
Bates and Lemmon (2003) and the second by Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009); the last 
two points, which are both associated with the board’s involvement in merger 
negotiations, have not been studied before. In this study, I attempt to fill this gap by 
manually collecting data on the target board meetings held throughout the negotiation 
process and by analyzing the effect of board meeting count and board response time on 
merger outcomes. 
For a sample of 513 M&A transactions announced between 2004 and 2008, I 
locate the filing(s) made with the SEC in relation to each deal. From these filings, I first 
extract the date on which the target and the acquirer make the first tangible contact to 
start the takeover process. Starting from the date of the first contact up to the date of 
announcement, I record the date of each target board meeting, where the directors 
discuss the current state of merger negotiations.  
Based on the evidence from lawsuits filed by shareholders who complain about 
the ineffectiveness of their boards during the sale of the company, I define two binary 
variables to measure target board involvement in the negotiation process. The high 
meeting count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held 
during the merger talks is greater than or equal to the sample median value of 5. The 
early board involvement variable equals one if the target board meets within a month of 
the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The one-month cut-off point 
also corresponds to the median number of days it takes for the target board to meet after 
the start of merger talks.  
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The arguments in shareholder litigation cases suggest skepticism toward target 
boards that are late in involvement in the sale process and toward those boards that 
commit very little time before approving the sale of the company. Hence, shareholders 
and courts appear to accept a view that the target board’s active involvement in 
negotiation process will improve merger results for target shareholders. Specifically, a 
target board actively involved in the sale process may be expected to be more informed 
about strategic alternatives before the firm, the intrinsic value of their firm and that of 
bidders, the details of each bidder’s proposal and about how potential conflicts of 
interest may affect deal outcomes. This information advantage may allow the board to 
perform its monitoring role more effectively and to provide higher quality advice, both 
of which may be expected to lead to better outcomes for target shareholders. Consistent 
with these expectations, the univariate analyses show that when the target board is late 
in involvement in negotiations, the median announcement period target cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) is 17.4%, whereas it is 22.0% in cases where the target board 
quickly steps in. In contrast, the high and low board meeting count subsamples are 
similar to each other in terms of shareholder wealth gains.  
Multivariate regression results indicate that early involvement of the target board 
in the sales process is associated with an increase of 5.7 percentage points in target 
CARs. With respect to the median target CAR of 19.9% in the entire sample, this is an 
economically significant improvement. In contrast, the number of meetings held by the 
board during the merger negotiation phase does not appear to affect target shareholder 
wealth.  
Further analysis reveals that the positive effect of early board involvement on 
target CARs is confined to the cases where the target shareholders have low control 
over their firms. This observation also holds when takeover premiums are considered. 
Specifically, when target shareholder control is low, the early involvement of the board 
in the sale process increases target CARs and takeover premiums by 7.4 and 5.7 
percentage points, respectively. However, these effects disappear when the target 
shareholder control in the firm is high. I argue that when there is low shareholder 
control, the target CEOs have a more dominant and powerful position in the firm; this 
dominance enables them to trade takeover premiums with more lucrative personal 
benefits (Moeller, 2005). In this context, my findings suggest that close monitoring by 
the target board serves to protect shareholder interests when shareholders cannot 
adequately protect their own interests.  
 60 
I also investigate whether the higher target CARs associated with early 
involvement of the target board to the negotiation process arise from a wealth transfer 
from acquirers to target shareholders. Multivariate regression results indicate that 
neither early board involvement in the sale process nor a high number of target board 
meetings has a significant impact on acquirer CARs. Similar results are obtained when 
the CARs for the combined firm (i.e. a value-weighted portfolio for the target and the 
acquirer firms) are analyzed with respect to the target board’s activity during 
negotiations. So, prompt involvement of target board in the sale process appears to 
make target shareholders better off while not making acquirer shareholders worse off.  
In further analysis, I investigate the potential channels through which target 
directors may create value for their shareholders. Firstly, I examine the competitiveness 
of the private negotiation process, since creating a competitive bidding environment 
may be one method by which active target boards achieve higher bids. Contrary to this 
expectation, neither of the two measures of target board activity seems to increase the 
likelihood of competition. Secondly, I examine whether active target boards reduce the 
likelihood of accepting unreasonably high termination fees, which are frequently cited 
in shareholder lawsuits as a major deterrent to receiving topping bids after the 
announcement of the deal. The results indicate that if the target board meets within one 
month of the start of negotiations or if it meets more than 5 times during the entire 
negotiation process, the likelihood of an unreasonably high termination fee decreases by 
9 percentage points.  
To conclude my analysis, I test whether early involvement of the target board in 
the sale process decreases the likelihood of the target CEO’s retention on the acquirer 
board. Such a negative relation may exist if close monitoring by the target board makes 
it more difficult for the CEO to discuss the details of his/her own subsequent career 
with the acquirer and possibly to make concessions to the detriment of the shareholders. 
Consistent with this argument, I find that target board’s prompt involvement in merger 
talks decreases the likelihood of CEO retention by 8 percentage points. Hence, it pays 
for the target CEO to keep the board out of the merger talks for an extended period of 
time. 
An alternative explanation for the positive relation between early board 
involvement and target CARs may be that receiving an attractive bid at the beginning of 
the process may cause the target managers to take action by immediately calling a board 
meeting. This attractive initial bid is likely to lead to an attractive final bid. In such a 
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setting, the relation between early board involvement and target CARs may be spurious. 
In an effort to evaluate the relevance of this alternative explanation, I show that the 
positive relation between early board involvement and target CARs continues to hold 
even in the cases where the target has not received a formal bid before the date of the 
first board meeting. 
This study builds on and contributes to two strands of literature. First, the work 
relates to the literature that investigates the effect of board’s activity on firm 
performance in normal times. In his seminal work on the subject, Vafeas (1999) finds a 
negative relation between the annual number of board meetings and firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Vafeas (1999) shows that this counter-intuitive finding is due 
to stock price declines being followed by more frequent board meetings. Other studies 
have followed Vafeas (1999) in examining the link between annual board meeting 
frequency and financial outcomes. Some of these studies find that an increased 
frequency of annual board meetings is associated with a favorable outcome for 
shareholders, implying a proactive role for boards (Carcello et al., 2002; Xie, Davidson 
and DaDalt, 2003; Laksmana, 2008; and Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2008), 
while others report it as associated with a poorer outcome for shareholders, implying a 
reactive role for boards (Zhang, Zhou and Zhou, 2007; Ebrahim, 2007; Johnson, Ryan 
and Tian, 2009; and Chen et al., 2006). My study extends this research in two directions 
by first focusing on crisis situations rather than on times of normalcy; and, secondly, on 
investigating whether the exact number of board meetings targeted to resolve an 
extraordinary event improves the outcome of that event for shareholders. 
The other closely related literature examines the link between the level of board 
monitoring exerted by the target board and target shareholder returns around merger 
announcement. These studies assume that certain board characteristics such as 
independence, lead to better board monitoring. Lee et al. (1992), Cotter, Shivdasani and 
Zenner (1997) and Moeller (2005) show that an independent target board is associated 
with significantly higher target shareholder gains while Bange and Mazzeo (2004) find 
no significant relation between the two. Furthermore, Bange and Mazzeo (2004) find 
that target shareholder gains are higher when target CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, a setting which would in fact be expected to lead to poor board monitoring. My 
paper contributes to this literature by using a more direct measure of board diligence 
during the negotiation process, without having to assume that certain board features 
lead to higher board diligence.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I first provide 
empirical background on the roles of the target board in an M&A context. I also present 
a review of the related literature. In Section 3.3, I introduce my sample and my 
methodology for gathering data and for constructing the board activity measures and 
other corporate governance variables. In Section 3.4, I analyze the effect of increased 
target board activity on announcement returns. In sections 3.5 and 3.6, I present how 
active involvement of the target board affects the private takeover process and target 
CEO retention, respectively. Section 3.7 provides a robustness check and Section 3.8 
concludes the paper. 
3.2 Empirical Background and Hypotheses 
The board of directors performs two key functions in the governance of a 
corporation: monitoring and advising top management. In a firm with dispersed 
ownership, no shareholder has sufficient incentive to adequately monitor management 
actions in order to ensure that their investment in the firm is put to their best possible 
use. The monitoring function of the board serves to overcome this collective action 
problem and also to protect minority shareholders from being hurt by controlling 
shareholders. On the other hand, with regard to its advisory function, the board is 
expected to review and guide corporate strategy and budget, to set performance 
objectives, to select executives and carry out succession planning and, to align 
executive compensation with long term corporate interests. In this section, I first 
emphasize on the need for effective board monitoring when a sale of a company is 
being considered. Next, I briefly discuss the relative importance of the advisory role of 
a target board with respect to its monitoring role. Then, I provide evidence on what is 
expected from the target board during the sale process based on a review of shareholder 
litigations and associated court rulings. Finally, I form my expectations about the 
relation of board activity with merger outcomes and present a survey of the related 
literature. 
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3.2.1 The Role for Board Monitoring 
The managers of a firm do not often own all or even a substantial amount of the 
firm’s equity, yet they hold the decision-making power in their hands. This separation 
of ownership and control in the modern corporation has long been argued to be a source 
of agency conflicts (Berle and Means, 1932). In this setting, management’s utility 
function is no longer fully aligned with that of the shareholders; hence, managerial 
decisions do not necessarily maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The sale process of a firm is a time when conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders are particularly exacerbated.  
When a sale of a firm is considered, the only concern shareholders have is to 
receive the highest price available for their shares. However, the CEO of the firm has 
much more to worry about. Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) find that only about 
50% of target CEOs are retained as an officer at the combined firm. Even if they are 
retained, their turnover rates are extremely high compared to the normal turnover rate 
observed in the literature (Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 2004; Hadlock, Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1999). Furthermore, once they lose their jobs, they have a hard time finding 
another executive post (Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack, 
2004). Faced with the risk of losing their future salaries, their bonuses, their ability to 
extract personal benefits from the firm as well as their power and prestige, CEOs have 
many more items on their agenda besides the offer price to be paid by the acquirer. 
They may negotiate over whether they will be retained in the combined firm, the level 
of compensation in case of retention or whether they will receive a one-time payment 
for negotiating the deal. An interesting agency problem is whether CEOs will use their 
privileged position in merger negotiations to agree on a lower offer price in exchange 
for higher personal benefits. 
Plenty of evidence in the literature suggests that the CEOs actually trade off the 
interests of shareholders for their own interests when a sale of the company is being 
considered. Brewer, Jackson and Wall (2006) find a negative relation between the post-
merger position of the CEO in the merged firm and target shareholders’ returns, for a 
sample of 162 bank mergers between 1990 and 2004. Similarly, based on a 
comprehensive sample of 2,198 completed deals announced between 1994 and 2010, 
Qui, Trapkov and Yakoub (2014) find that the retention of target CEO is associated 
with a 6 percentage point reduction in the takeover premium paid to shareholders.  
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Wulf (2004), on the other hand, investigates whether target CEOs trade-off their 
power in the post-merger firm with takeover premiums. Based on a sample of 40 
merger-of-equals (MOE) deals and a matched sample of 40 non-MOE mergers over the 
period from 1991 to 1999, Wulf (2004) shows that deals in which the target CEO 
obtains higher post-merger control rights (i.e. the target board has an equal or greater 
share on the combined firm’s board) are associated with target CARs which are 9% 
lower on average. 
Studies examining whether target CEOs agree on receiving lower premiums in 
exchange for increased pecuniary benefits produce results that are consistent with those 
obtained from the studies cited above. Fich, Cai and Tran (2011) study the effects of 
granting target CEOs unscheduled options during the confidential negotiation process, 
which are used to compensate managers for the benefits they give up. Based on a 
sample of 920 acquisition bids from 1999 to 2007, they estimate that for every dollar 
target CEOs receive from these options, the deal value drops by $62 on average7. 
Likewise, for the deals in which the target CEO is not retained, Qui, Trapkov and 
Yakoub (2014) document a negative relation between the relative importance of the 
severance pay received by the CEO and the premiums paid to shareholders. Finally, by 
aggregating 7 dummy variables each of which indicates a certain personal benefit 
accruing to the CEO, Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004) find that in deals involving 
extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO, target shareholders receive lower 
premiums. 
In this setting of heightened agency conflicts, the monitoring role of target boards 
assumes critical importance. By closely monitoring the CEO and the negotiations with 
bidders, the target board can protect shareholders’ interests against potential self-
serving behavior of the CEO.  
                                                 
7  In a related study, Heitzman (2011) investigates the determinants and effects of 
granting equity to the target CEO during merger negotiations, based on a sample of 471 
acquisitions of public U.S. firms announced between 1996 and 2006. The author reports 
that 33% of target CEOs receive a negotiation grant but finds no adverse effect of these 
grants on shareholder wealth. 
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3.2.2 The Role for Board Advice 
Since in practice, overseeing the management has always been viewed as the 
primary responsibility of the board, prior literature has mainly focused on the 
monitoring function of the board while the advisory role of the board has attracted little 
attention8. Among the recent studies that investigate boards’ advisory role, Faleye, 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2013) and Schmidt (2014) focus on the advisory role of the board 
in the context of acquisitions. Schmidt (2014) finds that social ties between the CEO 
and directors are associated with higher acquirer announcement returns when advisory 
needs are high and with lower returns when monitoring needs are high. He attributes 
this finding to the willingness of the CEO to share information with friendly directors, 
which allows the board to give better advice. However, friendly board members cannot 
effectively monitor the CEO. Similarly, Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2013) find that 
acquirer cumulative abnormal returns are higher by 80 basis points at firms with 
advisory directors while the time it takes for deal completion decreases by 17.1%. 
In the case of target firms, the incremental value of board’s advice may remain 
limited in comparison to the case of acquirer firms. First of all, it is almost a standard 
practice for target firms to retain a financial advisor during the sale process whereas 
acquirer firms are less likely to get financial advice. Likewise, target firms request a 
fairness opinion more often than do acquirer firms9. This difference may partly be due 
to the higher litigation threat faced by target executives and directors. Investment banks 
have an edge in providing advice due to their superior experience in structuring deals, 
so for target firms the marginal value of board advice may be negligible. Consistent 
with this expectation, Jack Byrne who was a director of Martin Marietta Corporation 
when the firm was raided by Bendix Corporation in 1982, depicts their excessive 
reliance on outside experts during this crisis situation as follows: 
                                                 
8 See Adams and Ferreira (2007) for a theoretical model on the relation between the 
level of board independence and the CEO’s willingness to share information with the 
board and the resulting ability of the board to perform its monitoring and advising roles. 
The authors show that a management-friendly board may turn out to be optimal in some 
firms and that policies requiring increased board independence may be detrimental for 
the shareholders of these firms.  
9 In my sample of 513 deals, 506 targets have retained financial advisors and 466 have 
obtained a fairness opinion. In contrast, 401 acquirers have a financial advisor and only 
166 have asked for a fairness opinion. 
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   “Despite good, solid conversations, the way I remember it is that by the 
time we would get around to voting, the technocrats would have constrained 
the options so much that you were almost always faced with a single 
alternative and I don’t think I can remember a vote that wasn’t unanimous. 
The technocrats just took 98% of the ball game right out of our hands.” 
Jack Byrne, Martin Marietta Corporation director 
- quoted from Lorsch and MacIver (1989) 
Moreover, given the increased conflict of interests between the target 
management and shareholders discussed in Section 3.2.1, the target board may be 
inclined to devote much of its time to monitoring.  
3.2.3 Legal Background on the Expectations from the Target Board 
Following the announcement of an M&A transaction, executives and directors of 
a target firm may be faced with shareholder class action lawsuits. Krishnan et al. (2012) 
report that between 1999 and 2000, about 10% of all M&A offers led to litigations by 
target shareholders. In these litigations, shareholders generally claim that directors of 
target firm breached their duties of loyalty and care or their Revlon duties by failing to 
maximize shareholder value in the deal. Duty of loyalty requires that directors act in the 
shareholders’ interests and not in their own interests when making a corporate decision. 
In order not to breach this duty, directors often excuse themselves of board meetings 
when there is an agenda item that involves a conflict of interests. Duty of care, on the 
other hand, requires directors to act in the same way as a prudent man in their position 
would act. To fulfill their duty of care in the making of an M&A deal, target directors 
have to gather all necessary information that would allow them to reach a well-founded 
decision and to take sufficient time to critically review that information.  
In addition to the duties of loyalty and care which the board owes to the 
shareholders at all times, when a sale of the company is considered, target boards of 
Delaware-incorporated firms should also comply with the so-called Revlon duties. 
When there is a sale of control or where the break-up of the company is inevitable, “the 
directors’ role change[s] from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”10  Put simply, 
                                                 
10 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). 
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once a company is “in play”, the directors’ fiduciary duties narrow to meeting only one 
specific goal: maximizing shareholder value by securing the highest price available. 
When deciding whether target directors should be held liable in a takeover event, 
the judge will be evaluating the case after the fact. It is possible that, after the fact, the 
final decision taken by the board turns out to be suboptimal or even completely false. 
However, even if this is the case, according to the business judgment rule, decision of 
the board will not be second-guessed by a court if the plaintiff cannot present a 
colorable issue that board members breached their duties when making that decision. So 
the key point is that it is the adequacy of the decision making process and not the final 
outcome of the deal that the judge evaluates. “So long as the court determines that the 
process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance 
corporate interests” 11  and the decision-making process is informed by all material 
information reasonably available, the directors cannot be held liable for their decisions. 
Having adopted this process-oriented perspective, U.S. courts do not impose or 
recommend a single blueprint of the steps a target board should take in order not to 
breach its fiduciary duties in a takeover event. Nevertheless, a review of litigation 
material reveals that there is a set of indicators that are referred to when claiming (or 
defending against) a breach of the duty of care or the duty of ‘extra’ care under Revlon. 
In this regard, target boards are mainly sued on the basis of a combination of the 
following factors: (i) not conducting an adequate auction process and/or limiting the 
firm’s ability to receive future bids12, (ii) not obtaining a fairness opinion13, (iii) holding 
only a few board meetings before approving the sale or (iv) failing to get involved early 
in the sale process.  
                                                 
11 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 1996 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
12 See, among others, the plaintiffs’ complaints in the following cases: In re Openlane, 
Inc. Shareholders Litigation, In re Bioclinica, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Omnicare, 
Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., In Re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 
In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigation. 
13 In the 1985 case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court held the target directors liable for 
breaching their duty of care by not sufficiently informing themselves about the 
adequacy of the offer price. Not obtaining a fairness opinion was one of the factors 
leading to this ruling. After this decision and subsequent cases, use of a fairness opinion 
became like a standard to protect managers and directors from subsequent shareholder 
litigation. 
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The first two points on this list have been studied in the prior literature with 
regard to their impact on merger outcomes. Boone and Mulherin (2007) find that wealth 
effects for target shareholders do not significantly differ in auctions and negotiations. 
Officer (2003) investigates whether the use of target termination fees actually harms 
target shareholders by deterring competing bids. Although he finds weak support for 
lower level of competition in the existence of termination fees, he finds evidence to 
suggest that such fees are associated with higher premiums and ultimately do not harm 
target shareholders. Similarly, Bates and Lemmon (2003) demonstrate that target 
termination fees are associated with higher takeover premiums and an increased 
probability of deal completion. On the other hand, Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009) show 
that when the target board obtains a fairness opinion the deal outcomes are not affected. 
Hence, neither of these two bases for plaintiff complaints appear to harm target 
shareholders when considered in isolation. 
The remaining two points on the list, which are both associated with the level of 
board’s involvement in merger negotiations, have not been studied previously, 
presumably due to the lack of relevant information in readily available databases. 
However, these items have been referred to in plaintiffs’ complaints, or board rulings of 
numerous significant lawsuits.14 
An example of shareholders’ frustration when their board remains inactive during 
merger negotiations is the shareholder class action against Lyondell Chemical Company 
directors. In the spring of 2007, Lyondell Chemical was the third-largest independent, 
publicly traded chemical company in the U.S., which was financially strong and was not 
prepared or looking to sell itself. In early June, Lyondell CEO met with his counterpart 
at Basell NV to negotiate over a potential acquisition. The board was aware of Basell’s 
potential interest in Lyondell, because on May 11, 2007 a Basell affiliate had disclosed 
in a 13D filing their intent to possibly engage in discussions with Lyondell regarding 
various transactions. On July 9, 2007, Lyondell CEO received an offer from Basell that 
represented a 45% premium, subject to the condition that Lyondell board signs a merger 
agreement within a week. The board became involved in negotiations only during this 
                                                 
14 See, among others, the following cases: In Re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. Shareholders 
Litigation, In re Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, In re Plains Exploration & 
Production Company Stockholder Litigation, Smith v. Van Gorkom, In re Toys “R” Us, 
Inc. Shareholder Litigation, In re McAfee, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Lyondell 
Chemical v. Ryan. 
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last week and signed the merger documents after considering the issue for a meager sum 
of 7 hours, spread over 4 board meetings. The plaintiffs claimed that Lyondell board 
breached its duty of care by not making an effort to get an understanding of the true 
value of the company or to explore strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value, 
over the period from May to July. The trial court depicted this period as follows:  
   “[T]he opinion clearly questions whether the Defendants “engaged” in 
the sale process... This is where the 13D filing in May 2007 and the 
subsequent two months of (apparent) Board inactivity became critical... 
[T]he directors made no apparent effort to arm themselves with specific 
knowledge about the present value of the Company in the May through July 
2007 time period despite admittedly knowing that the 13D filing . . . 
effectively put the company “in play”...15” 
The plaintiffs argued that the board could not have adequately informed itself 
about the value of the firm over a 7-day period and after deliberating the matter for 
merely 7 hours over 4 meetings. The court opined in favor of the plaintiffs and found 
the process chosen by Lyondell directors “troubling” under Revlon16. 
In the Lyondell Chemical Company case, the board was accused both for failing 
to get involved in negotiations promptly and also for committing too little a time to 
consider the Basell offer. In some other cases, the board is accused by plaintiffs for only 
one of these items. For instance, in a litigation by shareholders against the officers and 
directors of McAfee, Inc., plaintiffs put forth that the McAfee CEO did not inform the 
board about the discussions he held with Intel between March and May of 2010 
regarding the business opportunities the companies could exploit together. They argued 
that the McAfee board only got involved in the process when it received a bid in June of 
2010, which left McAfee at a strategic disadvantage in assessing the Intel offer. On the 
other hand, in the famous Smith v. Van Gorkom case, the court held the target directors 
liable for breaching their duty of care by failing to adequately evaluate the fairness of 
the price offered. The target directors approved the merger agreement at the end of a 2-
hour meeting based only on a presentation made by the CEO, who was highly likely to 
                                                 
15 Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 2008 WL 4174038 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
16 Although the Delaware Court of Chancery denied defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the plaintiffs’ Revlon claims, this ruling was later reversed by 
the Supreme Court of Delaware on the basis of a technical interpretation of when the 
Revlon duties start to apply. 
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put his own interests before those of the shareholders. In In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation and In re Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, where the 
shareholders claimed that their board failed to undertake an adequate process to sell the 
company, the court ruled in favor of the respective boards by highlighting, among other 
factors, that the boards regularly monitored the process and controlled managerial 
conflicts by holding 14 and 9 board meetings, respectively.  
3.2.4 Hypotheses and Related Literature  
In all the shareholder litigations discussed in the previous section, there seems to 
be skepticism towards boards that do not get involved in merger discussions early in the 
process and towards those boards that commit very little time to process the deal 
proposal. In contrast, boards that closely monitor the negotiations by holding regular 
meetings are viewed as having taken steps to adequately inform themselves about the 
deal and to control agency conflicts. Therefore shareholders and courts alike appear to 
assume a hypothesis that target board’s active involvement in the negotiation process 
will improve merger results for target shareholders. In this study, I test this hypothesis 
using (i) the number of days to the first board meeting after the start of the merger 
negotiations and (ii) the total number of meetings the target board holds during the 
negotiation process as proxies for board involvement in the sale process. Target boards 
that get involved early in the process and that meet frequently throughout the 
negotiations can be expected to be more informed about the strategic alternatives facing 
the firm, about the true value of the firm and that of bidders and details of each bidder’s 
proposal. Such boards will have a better idea of how potential conflicts of interest may 
affect deal outcomes and will have more time to discuss the routes to be taken to protect 
shareholders’ interests. This enhanced information may enable target boards to exercise 
more effective monitoring and to provide more useful advice, presumably resulting in 
better outcomes for shareholders. 
Even though the relation between board activity and M&A outcomes has not been 
investigated in the literature, some studies have examined the effect of board activity on 
firm value in the normal course of the business. Vafeas (1999) is the first to consider 
board meeting frequency, as a measure of board activity and board diligence. For a 
panel data of 307 firms over the period from 1990 to 1994, he obtains the information 
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on the annual number of board meetings of each firm from their proxy statements. 
Using this sample, he investigates whether an increased number of meetings leads to a 
higher firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Counter-intuitively, he finds that firms 
with boards that meet more frequently have lower value. However, this result appears to 
be driven by stock price declines being followed by more frequent board meetings. An 
analysis of performance changes after years with abnormally high meeting frequency 
reveals that such years are followed by improvements in operating performance. In an 
article that focus on the same questions as Vafeas (1999), Brick and Chidambaran 
(2010) use a simultaneous equations model with three equations to address endogeneity 
concerns and report that increases in board meeting frequency lead to increases in firm 
value. 
Following Vafeas’ (1999) seminal work, further evidence about the effect of 
board activity on corporate outputs and practices has been provided. Some studies show 
that as the annual board meeting frequency increases, better monitoring is provided and 
this results in a favorable outcome for shareholders. These studies suggest that annual 
meeting frequency is positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure on 
executive compensation (Laksmana, 2008), audit quality (Carcello et al., 2002), and is 
negatively associated with the degree of accounting discretion exercised by the 
management (Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2008; and Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt, 2003). In contrast, other articles indicate that annual board meeting frequency is 
positively related to the likelihood of internal control weaknesses (Zhang, Zhou and 
Zhou, 2007), to the level of earnings management (Ebrahim, 2007) and to the 
probability of committing accounting fraud in the US (Johnson, Ryan and Tian, 2009) 
and financial fraud in China (Chen et al., 2006). These articles suggest that the board 
meets more often as the problems faced by the firm increases, suggesting that board 
meetings are reactive measures. Finally, some other studies indicate that board meetings 
are just one of the ineffective tools used by boards (Adams and Mehran, 2011; Andres, 
Azofra and Lopez, 2005; Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma, 2004; Hagendorff, Collins and 
Keasey, 2010).  
Although the relation of the level of involvement of target firm’s board in merger 
negotiations and target shareholder gains has not been studied previously, there are a 
number of studies which link the level of monitoring exerted by the target board to 
target shareholder returns. Lee et al. (1992) investigate whether wealth gains in 
management buyouts are affected by the independence of the target board, which is 
 72 
commonly assumed to lead to better monitoring. Based on a sample of 58 going-private 
transactions between 1983 and 1989, the authors find that target cumulative abnormal 
returns are significantly higher when independent directors dominate the target board. 
Similarly, using a sample of 169 tender offers over a period from 1989 to 1992, Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) find that an independent target board is associated with 
significantly higher target shareholder gains. In contrast, based on a larger sample 
covering 436 bids over the period from 1979 to 1990, Bange and Mazzeo (2004) find no 
significant relation between target shareholder gains and board independence. In 
addition, they report that target shareholder gains are higher when the target has a dual 
leadership structure (i.e. roles of CEO and board chair held by the same person), which 
would be expected to result in less effective board monitoring. On the other hand, 
Moeller (2005) examines a sample of 388 takeovers from the more recent period of 
1990s and finds that when inside directors hold more than 40 percent of the target board 
seats, takeover premiums are reduced by almost 7 percentage points.  
The evidence from these two strands of literature indicates that more vigilant 
board monitoring does not necessarily lead to better results for shareholders, in normal 
times or when considering the sale of the company. Although it is interesting to analyze 
the effects of board independence, CEO duality or other similar board characteristics on 
target returns, such studies must assume that these board characteristics are associated 
with better board monitoring. With more direct measures of board diligence that it 
employs, this study is a first attempt to investigate the direct link between a higher level 
of board involvement in the sale process and target shareholder returns. 
3.3 Sample Formation and Data Collection 
3.3.1 Sample Formation 
I obtain a set of mergers and acquisitions announced between January 1, 2004 and 
December 31, 2008 from U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database of Thomson Reuters 
SDC Platinum. I apply the filters commonly used in the literature that the transaction is 
completed and that the deal value is greater than $5 million. To ensure that there is a 
change-in-control in the target and that the target is entirely owned by the acquirer after 
the deal, I restrict the sample to those deals in which the acquirer owns less than 50% of 
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the target when the deal is announced and increases its ownership to 100% with the 
deal. I require that both the target and the acquirer be U.S. public firms as of the 
announcement date since I calculate announcement returns for both. I match the 
resulting sample to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and 
require that both the target and the acquirer are available in CRSP as of the 
announcement date. To have sufficient observations for estimating the market model, I 
keep only the observations in which both firms have at least 100 days of return data in 
the period (-316, -64) prior to the deal announcement. I then match the sample to 
Compustat and exclude those deals in which either the target or the acquirer does not 
have financial statement data in the fiscal year just prior to the announcement. These 
filters leave 540 observations. To gather data on board involvement in the sale process, 
I refer to the merger documents filed with the SEC by either the target or the acquirer or 
both. Therefore, I omit the 6 deals that do not have a merger document in the EDGAR 
database. I further exclude the 9 deals for which a full set of target corporate 
governance variables is not available. Finally, I drop 12 deals in which the duration 
from the start of the negotiation process to the date of announcement is below the 1st 
percentile or above the 99th percentile of the respective distribution. I make this 
exclusion because given the way I define the board involvement variables, too short or 
too long a private negotiation process may artificially suppress or exaggerate board’s 
involvement in the process. The resulting sample consists of 513 deals. 
3.3.2 Collecting Data on the Background of the Deal 
To collect data on board involvement in the negotiation process, I refer to the 
EDGAR filing system of the SEC. For each transaction in my sample, I search the 
EDGAR for the M&A filings by the acquirer and the target after the deal is announced. 
The details of the transaction are usually found in DEFM14A, S-4, SC TO-T or 14D-9 
documents. The “Background of the Merger” or “Background of the Offer” sections of 
these documents disclose information on issues such as how and when the merger talks 
first started and how they proceeded, the names of the financial and legal advisors 
retained, the meetings held and decisions taken by the board of directors, contacts made 
with and bids received from other potential bidders, etc. From these background 
sections, I extract the date on which the target and acquirer make the first contact to 
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start seriously considering an M&A transaction 17 . From that date up to the 
announcement date, I record all the days on which the target board is reported to have 
met to discuss the current state of negotiations. 
From the M&A filings, I also record some other aspects of the merger process: (i) 
whether the target or the acquirer initiated the talks (Masulis and Simsir, 2013), (ii) the 
number of potential acquirers contacted and the number of potential acquirers making 
private bids (Boone and Mulherin, 2007), (iii) the length of the private takeover process 
(Aktas et al., 2012), and (iv) whether the target forms an M&A committee (Boone and 
Mulherin, 2014).  
3.3.3 Collecting Data on Target Corporate Governance 
Since the target board’s meeting activity during the negotiation process may be 
correlated with other characteristics of the board, it is necessary to control for these 
characteristics in the regression analyses. Therefore I extract corporate governance data 
from the most recent proxy statement (or in some rare cases, the annual report) of the 
target prior to the date of announcement. For each director on the target board, I record 
the independence status, tenure as a director and the level of ownership. For 
independent directors, I also record the names of other firms in which these directors 
serve. 
A director is categorized as independent if he is neither an employee of the firm 
nor a grey director. A director is considered to be grey if he is (i) a former employee of 
the firm, (ii) an employee of firm’s subsidiaries, (iii) a relative of an executive or (iv) a 
banker, investment banker, a consultant, a lawyer, a supplier to or a customer of the 
firm and has a material relation with the firm. In some cases, the independence status of 
each director is disclosed in the proxy statement. If a director that I classified as 
independent is disclosed as non-independent, I change the director’s status accordingly. 
                                                 
17 For the cases in which the firm initiates the sale process by itself or in which a firm 
other than the ultimate acquirer initiates the process, I do not take into account the 
period up to the date of the first contact with the ultimate acquirer, since the M&A 
filing usually provides rather less detail on that period. In addition, discussions between 
the acquirer and the target, which are preliminary in nature and which do not lead to 
serious talks in a reasonably short period of time, are not considered as the first contact.  
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The proxy statement reports the year in which a director was appointed to the 
board of directors for the first time. The tenure of a director is set equal to the difference 
between the year of appointment and the year of the proxy statement. 
The proxy statement also discloses the list of other firms in which the board 
members serve. For each independent director, I record these firms and check their 
public status to create a busy director indicator.  A director is defined to be busy if s/he 
holds two or more directorships in other public firms (Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim, 2010)18. 
I finally record the sum of the number of options exercisable within 60 days as of 
the date of the proxy statement and the number of shares held by each director. The 
division of this sum by the number of outstanding shares of the target firm gives the 
ownership percentage of each director in the firm. 
3.3.4 Defining the Board Involvement Variables 
Based on the legal background reviewed in Section 3.2.3, I define two binary 
variables to proxy for the level of board involvement in the merger negotiation process. 
The first variable is set equal to one if the number of board meetings held during the 
merger talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. This choice has practical 
relevance since in the case of Lyondell Chemical v. Ryan, plaintiffs argued that 
approving the merger after holding a total of 4 meetings was inadequate whereas in In 
re Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the court opined that holding 9 board 
meetings could be considered quite satisfactory.19 
                                                 
18 Prior to Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim (2010), the effect of director busyness on acquirer 
returns has been studied by Brown and Maloney (1999) and Harris and Shimizu (2004). 
I use the definition of Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim (2010) since they argue that the inclusion 
of all types of directors when measuring directors’ busyness as done by Brown and 
Maloney (1999) and Harris and Shimizu (2004) may prevent the detection of the 
negative effect of multiple directorship on firm performance. That is the reason why 
Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim’s (2010) measure focuses only on the busynesss of outside 
directors. 
19 Although I chose the median value of meeting count as the cut-off point, the effect of 
the board meeting count variable on shareholder wealth gains remains the same under 
many other possible definitions of this variable: (i) using the number of board meetings 
directly as a level, (ii) defining the cut-off for the binary variable at 25th or 75th 
percentile of board meeting count, (iii) calculating a “normal” level of board meetings 
(the number of meetings that would be held over the same period of time by an average 
firm or by the firm itself at normal times, which is computed based on the annual 
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The second variable equals one if the board meets within a month following the 
date when the target and the acquirer seriously considered the possibility of a merger for 
the first time. The one-month cut-off point corresponds to the median number of days 
that target boards take to meet after the start of the merger process. This cut-off point 
also has practical relevance since two months of board inactivity at the start of the sale 
process was one of the most important arguments against the target board in Lyondell 
Chemical v. Ryan case20. 
It may be argued that board meetings do not provide a clear measure of board’s 
involvement in the sale process since information flow between directors can continue 
even in the absence of formal board meetings. Although this argument may be partially 
valid, as suggested by the shareholder litigation cases in Section 3.2.3, courts and 
plaintiffs frequently use meetings as an evidence of higher board involvement. In 
addition, prior studies suggest that formal board meetings are a major means of 
information exchange between directors. Cukurova (2012b) indicates that the 
information exchange that takes place during the meetings is more valuable than that 
which takes place any other time. She reaches to this conclusion by analyzing outside 
directors’ trades around meeting dates and finding that outside directors earn higher 
returns when their trade is initiated after the meetings as compared to when it is initiated 
before the meetings. Likewise, Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) suggest that to 
make effective decisions, the board should have sufficient, well-organized periods of 
time together as a group. 
3.3.5 Sample Statistics 
Out of the sample of 513 M&A transactions, 259 target boards meet within a 
month of the start of merger talks and 296 boards meet at least 5 times before approving 
                                                                                                                                               
meeting frequency disclosed in the proxy statement published prior to the merger talks) 
and defining binary variables based on the level of deviation from this normal level, (iv) 
defining binary variables based on the residuals obtained from a regression modeling 
the number of board meetings in the merger process. 
20 The effect of early board involvement variable on shareholder wealth gain is robust to 
defining this variable as set equal to one if the board meets within a week, within 2 
weeks, within 3 weeks or within 1.5 months. However, when the cut-off point is defined 
as 2 months, the statistical significance is lost. 
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the deal. Panel A of Table 3.1 provides the distribution of deals over the 12 Fama-
French industries (Fama and French, 1997). In the entire sample, there is a 
concentration in finance and business equipment industries, with 33.3% and 25.0% of 
the targets operating in these two industries, respectively. In the following columns, I 
report the breakdown of each industry across the subsamples of late and early board 
involvement and across the subsamples of low and high board meeting count, 
respectively. The industry distributions of late and early board involvement subsamples 
closely follow the pattern in the full sample. On the other hand, there is some evidence 
that boards of target firms operating in business equipment, manufacturing, chemicals 
or utilities sectors are more likely to meet frequently and that boards of financial firms 
are less likely to do so. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the distribution of transactions over announcement 
years. In the entire sample, the number of transactions per year is rather stable until it 
drops in year 2008, probably due to the decline in overall capital liquidity as the 
financial crisis sets in. Again, the distributions of late and early board involvement 
subsamples broadly track the trend in the full sample. With respect to low and high 
board meeting count subsamples, there is some evidence that target boards have started 
to be more active in the recent years. Whereas in 2008 almost 75% of target boards met 
5 or more times before approving the merger, the same figure was only around 51% in 
2004. To account for potential trends over years and for differences across industries, I 
include year and industry dummies in the multivariate regressions. 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for various target, acquirer, and deal 
characteristics as well as those for cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the merging 
firm shareholders. All variables are defined in Table A.1 of Appendix B. I provide the 
medians for continuous variables and the means for discrete variables. The first column 
presents the statistics for the full sample, followed by the late and early board 
involvement subsamples and low and high meeting count subsamples, respectively. In 
the subsequent two columns, I report the differences between these statistics across the 
subsamples. 
The late and early board involvement subsamples do not seem to differ with 
regard to target, acquirer or deal characteristics. However, for deals in which the target 
board is late in getting involved in the sale process, the average target CAR is 17.4%, 
whereas this figure is 22.0% when the target board promptly steps in. Furthermore, 
combined CARs are 1.4 percentage points higher in the case of an early target board 
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involvement and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
Although weak, there is also some evidence that early involvement of the target board is 
associated with higher acquirer CARs. So the univariate evidence suggests that an 
active target board leads to better results for both acquirer and target shareholders.  
Comparison of subsamples of low and high meeting count reveals a different 
picture. The two subsamples differ from each other with respect to many target, acquirer 
and deal characteristics but they are similar to each other in terms of shareholder wealth 
gains. Target firms with boards that meet at least 5 times during the sale process are 
about 57% larger than their counterparts with less active boards. In addition, their 
financial standing appears to be stronger as they have higher Tobin’s Q and lower 
leverage. Acquirers in these deals with active target boards also have higher Tobin’s Q 
and lower leverage as compared to acquirers of firms with less active boards.  
With regard to deal characteristics, the incidence of all-equity financing is lower 
in the high meeting count sample. Since receiving cash relieves target firm’s concerns 
over acquirer’s true value to some extent, holding everything else constant, payment in 
cash is preferable by target shareholders. Hence, active boards may be pushing the 
acquirers towards paying at least partially in cash. Deals in which the target board meets 
more frequently are also more likely to be diversifying deals. The target boards may be 
in need of more time to understand the value of the acquirer and potential synergies 
when the acquirer is from another industry. The low meeting count subsample is also 
associated with a higher incidence of a special M&A committee formed by the target. 
This finding may suggest that the M&A committee meetings partially substitute for 
meetings held by the full board. Finally, Table 3.2 reveals that there are on average 8 
directors in the subsample of target boards that meet frequently whereas this figure is 9 
for less active boards. It is possible that when the board size increases, it becomes 
harder to set a time for board meetings due to heightened scheduling conflicts. 
On average target boards in the early board involvement subsample meets within 
15 days of the start of merger negotiations whereas this figure is 3 months for the late 
board involvement subsample. There is no significant difference between these two 
subsamples with respect to the number of board meetings held during the entire process. 
On the other hand, an average board in the high meeting count subsample meets almost 
8 times during the process, whereas that in the low meeting count subsample meets only 
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3 times. As Table 3.2 shows, boards that meet more frequently also get involved in the 
process about 16 days earlier21. 
Given the significant differences with respect to target, acquirer and deal 
characteristics across the low and high meeting count subsamples, I will control for all 
of these characteristics in the multivariate regression analysis. 
3.4 Target Board Involvement and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In this part, I analyze whether and how active involvement of the target board in 
the negotiation process affects announcement period cumulative abnormal returns 
accruing to the hypothetical combined firm and, to the target and the acquirer firms, 
separately.  
3.4.1 Calculation of CARs 
I calculate the CARs based on the standard event study methodology suggested by 
Brown and Warner (1985). I first estimate the market model for each firm by regressing 
that firm’s daily returns on market returns over the period (-316, -64) relative to deal 
announcement. I use CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns as a proxy for market 
returns and require each firm to have at least 100 days of non-missing return data over 
the estimation period. After estimating the market model parameters, I calculate daily 
abnormal returns of each firm by subtracting the daily returns predicted by the market 
model from actual daily returns. I reach announcement period CARs by summing up 
daily abnormal returns over the event window, (-5, +5) around the deal announcement 
date. 
Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), I calculate combined CARs as CARs 
accruing to a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer. The portfolio 
weights are calculated based on each firm’s market value of equity as of the 64th 
                                                 
21 The correlation between early board involvement and meeting count binary variables 
is 0.075, causing little concern over multicollinearity. 
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trading day before the deal announcement. If the acquirer has a toehold in the target, I 
adjust the target’s weight for this toehold. 
3.4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis in Table 3.2 indicates that target board’s early 
involvement in the merger process is associated with better outcomes for both target 
and acquirer shareholders. There is also some evidence that combined CARs are 
slightly higher when the target board is more active as measured by the number of 
meetings held during the sale process. Table 3.2 also shows that deals with target boards 
that meet frequently are significantly different than those with less active boards with 
respect to several target, acquirer and deal attributes. Given that these attributes may 
also affect CARs, I analyze in this section the robustness of the univariate analysis by 
running multivariate regressions. 
Table 3.3 presents the regressions with target CARs over the period (-5, +5) as the 
dependent variable. The variables of interest are the binary variables Early Board 
Involvement, which equals 1 when the target board meets within a month of the start of 
merger negotiations and High Meeting Count which equals 1 when the target board 
meets at least 5 times before approving the merger. In the first column, the only 
explanatory variables are the two indicators described above. In the second column, I 
add control variables that have been shown to influence target or acquirer CARs by 
prior studies: acquisitions in which target and acquirer are in the same industry (Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990), form of acquisition (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), hostility 
(Schwert, 2000), competition (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Boone and Mulherin, 
2007), method of payment (Travlos, 1987;  Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002), 
relative size (Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1983), Tobin’s q (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991), leverage (Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell, 1993), 
initiation (Masulis and Simsir, 2013), toehold (Betton and Eckbo, 2000), fairness 
opinion obtained (Kisgen, Qien and Song, 2009), target termination fee (Officer, 2003; 
Bates and Lemmon, 2003), local deal (Uysal, Kedia and Panchapagesan, 2008). Given 
the negative relation between annual board meeting frequency and prior stock 
performance in Vafeas (1999), I also control for buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 
period (-316, -64). 
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In the next column, I add controls for target board characteristics that may be 
associated with the level of board involvement in the sale process and also with target 
CARs and so may lead to omitted variable bias if not included in the model. Many of 
these variables were previously studied in the context of mergers and acquisitions: 
board independence (Lee et al., 1992; Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, 1997; and Bange 
and Mazzeo, 2004), use of special M&A committees (Boone and Mulherin, 2014), 
board size (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004), dual CEO (Bange and Mazzeo, 2004), 
percentage of busy directors (Harris and Shimizu, 2004; Ahn, Jiraporn and Kim, 2010), 
CEO ownership (Moeller, 2005) and independent director ownership (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, 1997). I also add board tenure that has 
been shown by Beasley (1996) and Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) to affect corporate 
outcomes in contexts unrelated to M&As. To control for potential conflicts of interests 
between directors and the shareholders, I add board interlock 22  and target board 
retention variables. 
The results from the first model indicate that the prompt involvement of the target 
board in merger negotiations is associated with a 5.7 percentage point increase in target 
CARs. This result is robust to the inclusion of the full set of control variables from the 
M&A literature in the second model and to the further addition of corporate governance 
variables in the third model. Given that the median target CAR is 19.9% in the full 
sample, a 5.7 percentage point increase in target CARs is economically large. On the 
other hand, holding a high number of board meetings does not appear to affect target 
shareholder wealth.  
Among the control variables in Table 3.3, stock payment, relative size, target size 
and target prior performance have strong explanatory power for target CARs both in 
models (2) and (3). The coefficients of these variables are consistent with earlier 
studies. Payment with acquirer stock turns out to reduce target CARs, in accordance 
with Huang and Walkling (1987), Officer (2003) and Moeller (2005) who report a 
                                                 
22 Instead of the board interlock variable, it is also possible to use the Close Tie and 
Distant Tie variables introduced in Chapter 2. Close Tie is equal to 1 if the M&A filings 
or news articles report the existence of a social tie between the directors or executives of 
the acquirer and the target and the connected individuals know each other very well. On 
the other hand, Distant Tie is equal to 1 if there is a social tie between the merging 
parties but the tie is not close. The findings on the effect of early board involvement and 
high meeting count variables on shareholder wealth are robust to the inclusion of Close 
Tie and Distant Tie variables into the multivariate regressions. 
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positive impact of cash payment on target CARs. Cash payment is preferable by target 
stockholders since it reduces the need to understand the intrinsic value of the acquirer. 
Similar to Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Moeller (2005) and Boone and Mulherin (2007), I 
find that a higher relative size reduces target shareholder wealth. A larger target size is 
also found to be associated with lower target returns, consistent with Schwert (2000), 
Officer (2003) and Bargeron et al. (2008). Finally, similar to Moeller (2005) and 
Bargeron et al. (2008), I find that pre-merger performance of targets have an opposite 
impact on target CARs. This result suggests that investors expect the merger to improve 
the performance of poorly performing targets. Alternatively, poorly performing firms 
may have their share price depressed due to the costs of financial distress they face. In 
that case, the price jump upon merger announcement would also reflect the positive 
reaction given to the elimination of financial distress costs. 
Among the corporate governance variables in model (3), only the M&A 
committee indicator and the CEO ownership variable turn out to have a significant 
impact on target shareholder wealth. The positive relation between target CEO 
ownership and target CARs may be a manifestation of better alignment of CEO 
incentives with shareholder interests. This result is in contrast to Moeller (2005) who 
finds no significant impact of higher CEO ownership on target premiums. The existence 
of an M&A committee, on the other hand, is associated with significantly lower target 
CARs. This finding contrasts that of Boone and Mulherin (2014), who finds an 
insignificant effect. However, they find that the propensity to form a committee is 
positively related to the severity of conflict of interests. So the negative coefficient 
observed in Model (3) may be due to the M&A committee dummy proxying for higher 
levels of conflict of interests. 
Moeller (2005) argues that only dominant and powerful target CEOs can 
influence target shareholder returns in exchange for more lucrative personal benefits. 
Hence, board’s active monitoring may be more critical when shareholder control over 
the firm is low. Following Moeller (2005), I define a high shareholder control dummy, 
which equals 1 when CEO and board chair positions are separated, CEO ownership is 
less than 20%, CEO tenure is less than 5 years and percentage of independent directors 
is greater than 60%. With this definition, 24% of the target firms in the sample are 
classified as having high shareholder control. Model (4) incorporates the high 
shareholder control variable and its interaction with the early board involvement 
variable. To avoid multicollinearity, the components of the high shareholder control 
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variable are excluded from the model. The results indicate that when shareholder 
control is low, early involvement of the target board has a critical role, as it is associated 
with a 7.4 percentage increase in target CARs. On the other hand, when shareholder 
control is high, this positive effect is completely offset by the coefficient of the 
interaction variable, which is -7.6%. These findings suggest that close board monitoring 
mainly serves to protect shareholder interests when shareholders are not sufficiently 
capable of doing so. 
An obvious channel through which target directors may increase returns to their 
shareholders is by pushing potential bidders to increase their offers. To examine 
whether early board involvement indeed helps target shareholders to receive higher 
premiums, I regress target premiums on the same explanatory variables used in 
explaining target CARs. The dependent variable is defined as the offer price divided by 
price of target stock 64 trading days prior to deal announcement minus 1. The results 
are shown in Table 3.4. The first three models indicate that early board involvement has 
no significant effect on the premiums received. However, results change when, in 
Model (4), the effect of early board involvement is allowed to vary based on the level of 
target shareholder control. According to this model, early board involvement has a 
significantly positive impact on takeover premiums when target shareholder control is 
low and so the target CEO is more capable of trading premiums for personal benefits. 
Consistent with the results in Table 3.3, early board involvement has no significant 
impact when there is high target shareholder control. 
It is possible that the higher target CARs associated with the early involvement of 
target board are merely due to a wealth transfer from acquirer shareholders to target 
shareholders. To investigate this possibility, I present in Table 3.5 the results from a set 
of regressions of acquirer CARs on the same explanatory variables used in the previous 
regressions. Neither the early board involvement nor the high board meeting count 
variable has a significant impact on acquirer CARs. Hence while increasing target 
CARs or even premiums paid by the acquirer (in the case of low target shareholder 
control), target board’s early involvement does not seem to lower acquirer CARs. 
Active monitoring by the target board may force the acquirer to make more concessions 
to the target shareholders but may, at the same time, prevent the target CEOs from 
negotiating excessive monetary benefits or their retention with the acquirers. This may 
be the reason why the net effect of an active target board on acquirer returns turns out to 
be neutral. 
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In Table 3.6, I investigate whether active involvement of the target board leads to 
higher returns to shareholders overall, by running a regression using combined CARs as 
the dependent variable. Although the early board involvement variable has a 
significantly positive coefficient in the first model, when control variables are included 
in subsequent models, the coefficient loses its significance. Given the low median 
relative size of around 17.5%, the higher CARs accruing to the target shareholders are 
not able to sufficiently influence the returns to the combined firm. 
3.5 Target Board Involvement and the Private Negotiation Process 
Results from the previous section indicate that when the target board quickly gets 
involved in the negotiation process, the target experiences higher abnormal returns upon 
the announcement of the deal. This effect is mainly driven by the sample of targets with 
a low shareholder control, suggesting that close board monitoring in the making of the 
deal is particularly useful when the target CEO is dominant and powerful and hence is 
able to extract personal benefits from the acquirer. An important factor contributing to 
an increased level of target CARs is found to be the higher level of premiums paid by 
the acquirers. In this section, I will further investigate the potential channels through 
which the target directors may be increasing returns to their shareholders. 
3.5.1 Competition in the Private Takeover Process 
Revlon duties require directors to secure the highest price available for the 
stockholders at the sale of the company. Obtaining bids from multiple parties can be 
considered a first step in achieving this goal. While the target management may be 
inclined to confine the merger talks to a few bidders, which could provide them the 
highest personal benefits; the directors, once they are involved in the talks, may invite 
additional bidders to the bidding process to ensure that the final offer received is more 
likely to be the best price available in the market. Creating a more competitive bidding 
process may be one method by which active target boards obtain higher premiums. 
Following Boone and Mulherin (2007), I extract competition data from SEC 
M&A filings by counting the number of bidders making a formal bid (i.e. a written 
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proposal, which contains pricing terms) in the private takeover process. Table 3.7 
presents the results of the logistic model predicting the likelihood of a competitive 
takeover process. The dependent variable, Competition, is set equal to 1 when number 
of bidders making a formal bid in the private takeover process is greater than 1.23 
Control variables are taken directly from the Boone and Mulherin (2007) model and are 
defined in Table A.1 of Appendix B. The first model indicates that neither the early 
involvement of the target board nor holding frequent board meetings is associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of competing bids. This result continues to hold when year 
and industry dummies are added in Model (2) and when corporate governance variables 
are added in Model (3).  
Model (3) provides some interesting insight on the effect of other target corporate 
governance characteristics on the likelihood of competition. The existence of an M&A 
special committee is associated with a greater likelihood of competition. This evidence 
is consistent with Boone and Mulherin (2014), who report that deals with a special 
committee used an auction 77.3% of the time whereas the same figure is 54.4% for 
deals without a special committee. Results from Model (3) also show that there is a 
positive and significant relation between independent director ownership and the 
likelihood of competition. An increased level of ownership is likely to incentivize 
independent directors to seek higher bids, hence increasing competition. On the other 
hand, conflict of interests between the directors and shareholders may lead directors to 
trade off their own interests with those of shareholders. Consistent with this expectation, 
when a higher percentage of target directors is retained on the merged company’s board, 
the likelihood of competition decreases. Similarly, the existence of a common director 
on the boards of the merging companies leads to a lower probability of competition. 
3.5.2 Target Termination Fees 
A target termination fee clause in the merger agreement requires the target to pay 
the bidder a significant fee if the target later backs off from the proposed merger. 
Termination fees are often viewed as a mechanism used by self-interested target 
managers to discourage competing bids to emerge after the announcement of the deal 
                                                 
23 The results are unchanged if I define Competition as equal to 1 if the number of 
parties contacted by the target firm is greater than 1. 
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and to protect the negotiated deal that presents them attractive personal benefits (Bates 
and Lemmon, 2003; and Officer, 2003). Given that the use of target termination fees 
has almost become an industry standard24, the question now is not whether or not there 
is a target termination fee in the merger agreement but whether the termination fee is 
within the range of reasonableness. As discussed in Section 3.2.3, unreasonably high 
termination fees are frequently cited in shareholder litigations as a serious deterrent to 
receiving topping bids. To define the range of reasonableness for termination fees, 
plaintiffs in In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation put forth, with reference to 
Coates and Subramanian (2000), that any termination fee of 3% or more “has a 
reasonable likelihood of foreclosing higher value bidders.” Based on this definition of 
an unreasonably high termination fee, I investigate in this section whether more active 
target boards help to reduce the likelihood of agreeing to such high termination fees. 
Table 3.8 presents the results from a logistic regression, which models the 
likelihood of an unreasonably high target termination fee. The dependent variable 
equals 1 when the target termination fee exceeds 3% of the deal value. The first model 
includes the variables used by Officer (2003) in modeling the existence of a target 
termination fee. The results indicate that target board activity during the negotiation 
process is negatively associated with the likelihood of agreeing to an unreasonably high 
termination fee. Both the early board involvement and the high meeting count dummies 
have negative and significant coefficients and they are jointly significant. Specifically, 
if the board promptly meets within 1 month of the start of merger talks or if it meets at 
least 5 times during the entire process, the likelihood of an unreasonably high 
termination fee decreases by around 9% 25 . In Model (2), I add year and industry 
dummies and in Model (3), I further add governance-related variables for the target. The 
negative relation between target board activity and the dependent variable is robust to 
the inclusion of these variables to the model. 
                                                 
24 93.4% of the 513 deals in my sample have target termination fee clauses. 
25 The marginal effects are evaluated at the medians of the other explanatory variables. 
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3.6 Effect of an Active Target Board on Target CEO Retention 
Close monitoring by the board may make it harder for the target CEO to 
thoroughly discuss his/her own subsequent career with potential acquirers and secure an 
attractive post in the combined company, possibly by granting concessions at the 
expense of shareholders. To test this argument, I investigate whether the early 
involvement of target board in the negotiation process decreases the likelihood of the 
target CEO being retained by the acquirer. If this is indeed the case, then it pays for the 
target CEO to keep the board out of the process for a longer period of time. 
Based on the first proxy statement filed by the combined firm after the completion 
of the deal, I determine whether the target CEO still serves on the combined firm’s 
board after the deal is completed 26 . Table 3.9 presents the results from a logistic 
regression, which models the likelihood of target CEO retention on the combined board. 
The control variables are created based on Ishii and Xuan (2014), Renneboog and Zhao 
(2013) and Harford (2003). I add a local deal dummy since a CEO may be more likely 
to be retained if the merger does not require relocation. I also add a dummy for 
transactions structured as a merger of equals, in which case the targets could ask for a 
higher board representation. Consistent with the argument above, the results indicate 
that when the target board is quickly involved in merger talks, the probability of target 
CEO retention decreases by 8 percentage points27. 
The other results from Table 3.9 show that a CEO is significantly more likely to 
be retained if s/he has been a CEO for a longer period of time, if the relative size of the 
target compared to the acquirer is larger, if the payment is done completely by acquirer 
stock or the deal is structured as a merger of equals. All of these factors is likely to 
strengthen the bargaining position of the CEO and hence to lead to a higher retention 
probability. On the other hand, the evidence on the effect of prior target performance on 
the likelihood of CEO retention is mixed. While target Tobin’s Q has a positive and 
significant coefficient, the coefficient of prior target adjusted return is negative and 
significant. 
                                                 
26 It is possible for the target CEO to be retained as an executive but not be invited as a 
board member. 
27 The marginal effects are evaluated at the medians of the other explanatory variables in 
Model (1). 
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3.7 Robustness 
Another possible explanation for the positive relation between the early board 
involvement variable and target CARs is that receiving an attractive bid at the 
beginning of the process, which causes the target management to react and call a board 
meeting straightaway, eventually leads to an attractive final bid. Therefore the positive 
relation observed between early board involvement and target CARs may be spurious. 
To investigate the relevance of this alternative explanation, I split the early board 
involvement subsample into two groups based on whether the target receives a formal 
bid from the acquirer before the date of the first board meeting. If the target receives a 
bid in this period, the board might have convened in response to an attractive initial bid. 
So this subsample could indeed be subject to the alternative explanation given above. 
However, the deals in which the target does not receive a bid up to the first board 
meeting but the board meets within a month of the start of merger talks are not expected 
to be subject to this alternative explanation.  
In Table 3.10, I rerun the target CAR regressions by modifying the early board 
involvement variable. Early board involvement (no bid) is set equal to 1 if the target 
board meets within 1 month without receiving a bid and 0 otherwise. For 182 deals, this 
variable takes the value of 1. On the other hand, Early board involvement (with bid) is 
set equal to 1 for the 77 deals in which the target board receives a bid before the 
meeting. 
According to Table 3.10, the positive relation between early board involvement 
and target CARs continues to hold even if the target has not received a bid from the 
acquirer prior to the first board meeting. In all three models, the coefficient of Early 
board involvement (with bid) is greater than that of Early board involvement (no bid) 
and it has higher statistical significance. These results indicate that although the 
alternative explanation might indeed have some influence on the positive relation 
observed between early board involvement and target CARs, it does not fully explain 
the relationships between variables. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Evidence from lawsuits initiated by target shareholders suggests that shareholders 
and courts are skeptical towards target boards that are late in getting involved in the sale 
process and those that approve the sale after only a few board meetings. Target boards 
that are actively involved in the process may be expected to exercise better monitoring, 
to provide higher quality advice and to make more informed decisions, leading to better 
results for target shareholders. This study examines the validity of this expectation 
using two measures of target board activity: the number of days it takes for the target 
board to meet after the start of the sale process and the number of meetings held by the 
board over the entire process. Data on board meetings are extracted manually from the 
M&A forms that the merging parties file with the SEC. 
The results suggest that the early involvement of the target board in merger 
negotiations is associated with an increase of 5.7 percentage points in target CARs. This 
finding holds even when the target board has not received a bid from the acquirer before 
holding its first meeting, dismissing an alternative explanation whereby attractive initial 
bids lead to both early involvement of target board and attractive final bids. In contrast, 
number of meetings held by the target board does not affect target CARs. 
The positive effect of early involvement of target board on target CARs is driven 
by cases in which the CEO has a powerful position in the target firm, suggesting that 
close monitoring by the board serves to protect shareholder interests especially when 
shareholders are less able to protect their own interests. In such cases, target board’s 
early involvement also leads to significantly higher takeover premiums. Although early 
involvement of the board benefits target shareholders, it may hurt target CEOs since it 
leads to a significant decrease in the likelihood of retention of the CEO. It appears that 
not having the board around for a sufficient time allows CEOs to freely negotiate their 
subsequent career with the acquirer. 
Investigating the effects of an active target board on various aspects of the private 
negotiation process reveals that neither early board involvement nor a high meeting 
count leads to a higher probability of having a competitive bidding environment. On the 
other hand, both of the board activity measures are associated with a decreased 
likelihood of agreeing to an unreasonably high target termination fee.  
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Overall, my results suggest that out of the two aspects of target board activity 
cited in shareholder lawsuits; early involvement and not the number of meetings held, is 
critical for shareholder value creation, specifically when the CEO has a powerful 
position in the target firm. Early involvement in the process may allow target directors 
to set a strategy right at the beginning of negotiations, leaving the CEO with limited 
room to maneuver. Furthermore, directors’ early involvement may also be sending the 
message to the target CEO that they are powerful and that no matter how the CEO 
shapes the merger agreement, they are the ultimate authority to reject the agreement if 
they are not satisfied with its terms. 
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3.9 Tables 
Table 3.1 Sample distribution 
 
This table presents the frequency distribution of 513 M&A transactions between U.S. public firms announced in the period from 2004 to 2008. Each deal is 
completed and has a value of at least $5 million. The acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the deal and owns 100% of it after the deal. Both the 
target and acquirer are covered by CRSP and Compustat. For each deal, there is a deal-related SEC filing available at EDGAR and for each target, a full set of 
corporate governance variables is available. Panel A and B provide the distribution of deals by target industry and announcement year, respectively. The first 
column reports the numbers for the entire sample, followed by the four subsamples of late and early target board involvement and low and high meeting count, 
respectively. The column percentages are provided for the full sample whereas for the four subsamples, row percentages are provided. If the target board 
meets within a month of the start of merger negotiations, the deal is classified under the “early board involvement” subsample; otherwise it is classified under 
the “late board involvement” subsample.  If the target board meets at least 5 times during the negotiation process, the transaction is grouped under the “high 
meeting count” subsample; otherwise it is assigned to the “low meeting count” subsample. The target’s industry is defined by the Fama-French 12-industry 
categories. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Panel A: By target industry 
  
Full sample Late Board Involvement 
Early Board 
Involvement Low Meeting Count 
High Meeting 
Count 
FF12 industry of the target 
Number Column Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage 
Consumer NonDurables 14 2.7% 6 42.9% 8 57.1% 8 57.1% 6 42.9% 
Consumer Durables 3 0.6% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 
Manufacturing 28 5.5% 14 50.0% 14 50.0% 8 28.6% 20 71.4% 
Energy 18 3.5% 9 50.0% 9 50.0% 11 61.1% 7 38.9% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 7 1.4% 1 14.3% 6 85.7% 0 0.0% 7 100.0% 
Business Equipment 128 25.0% 66 51.6% 62 48.4% 31 24.2% 97 75.8% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 14 2.7% 6 42.9% 8 57.1% 6 42.9% 8 57.1% 
Utilities 4 0.8% 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 4 100.0% 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 27 5.3% 15 55.6% 12 44.4% 9 33.3% 18 66.7% 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 63 12.3% 30 47.6% 33 52.4% 19 30.2% 44 69.8% 
Finance 171 33.3% 83 48.5% 88 51.5% 105 61.4% 66 38.6% 
Other 36 7.0% 20 55.6% 16 44.4% 18 50.0% 18 50.0% 
Total 513 100.0% 254 49.5% 259 50.5% 217 42.3% 296 57.7% 
                      
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: By announcement year 
 
  
Full sample Late Board Involvement 
Early Board 
Involvement Low Meeting Count 
High Meeting 
Count 
Deal announcement year Number 
Column 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage Number 
Row 
Percentage 
2004 121 23.6% 67 55.4% 54 44.6% 59 48.8% 62 51.2% 
2005 103 20.1% 53 51.5% 50 48.5% 43 41.7% 60 58.3% 
2006 110 21.4% 51 46.4% 59 53.6% 53 48.2% 57 51.8% 
2007 103 20.1% 45 43.7% 58 56.3% 41 39.8% 62 60.2% 
2008 76 14.8% 38 50.0% 38 50.0% 21 27.6% 55 72.4% 
Total 513 100.0% 254 49.5% 259 50.5% 217 42.3% 296 57.7% 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of 513 M&A transactions between U.S. public firms announced in the period from 2004 to 2008. Medians are 
provided for continuous variables and means for discrete variables. Each deal is completed and has a value of at least $5 million. The acquirer owns less than 
50% of the target before the deal and owns 100% of it after the deal. Both the target and acquirer are covered by CRSP and Compustat. For each deal, there is 
a deal-related SEC filing available at EDGAR and for each target, a full set of corporate governance variables is available. The first column reports the 
numbers for the entire sample, followed by the four subsamples of late and early target board involvement and low and high meeting count, respectively. The 
subsequent two columns report the difference between the statistics across the different subsamples. If the target board meets within a month of the start of 
merger negotiations, the deal is classified under the “early board involvement” subsample; otherwise it is classified under the “late board involvement” 
subsample.  If the target board meets at least 5 times during the negotiation process, the transaction is grouped under the “high meeting count” subsample; 
otherwise it is assigned to the “low meeting count” subsample. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
  
(I) 
Full 
sample 
(II) 
Late Board 
Involvement 
(III) 
Early Board 
Involvement 
(IV) 
Low 
Meeting 
Count 
(V) 
High 
Meeting 
Count 
(III)-(II) 
Early - Late 
Board 
Involvement 
(V)-(IV) 
High - Low 
Meeting Count 
No of 
Observations 
Target related                     
Firm size ($ mil) 306.463 286.075 309.984 234.027 366.758 23.909   132.730 ** 513 
Tobin's q 1.438 1.428 1.450 1.169 1.693 0.022   0.524 *** 511 
Leverage 0.085 0.085 0.088 0.127 0.049 0.003   -0.077 *** 510 
Adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.075 -0.084 -0.071 -0.061 -0.087 0.013   -0.026   492 
Acquirer related                     
Firm size ($ mil) 3,036.161 3,116.528 2,860.488 3,040.964 3,000.696 -256.040   -40.268   513 
Tobin's q 1.489 1.489 1.486 1.223 1.686 -0.003   0.463 *** 512 
Leverage 0.112 0.117 0.111 0.150 0.086 -0.006   -0.064 *** 507 
Adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.006 -0.017 -0.001 -0.018 0.001 0.016   0.018   497 
        (Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 
(I) 
Full 
sample 
(II) 
Late Board 
Involvement 
(III) 
Early Board 
Involvement 
(IV) 
Low 
Meeting 
Count 
(V) 
High 
Meeting 
Count 
(III)-(II) 
Early - Late 
Board 
Involvement 
(V)-(IV) 
High - Low 
Meeting 
Count 
No of 
Observations 
Deal characteristics                     
All stock 0.228 0.252 0.205 0.309 0.169 -0.047   -0.140 *** 513 
Relative size 0.175 0.175 0.176 0.160 0.192 0.000   0.031   513 
Tender offer 0.101 0.083 0.120 0.060 0.132 0.037   0.072 *** 513 
Hostile 0.025 0.020 0.031 0.037 0.017 0.011   -0.020   513 
Competition (No. of contacted parties > 1) 0.708 0.701 0.714 0.687 0.723 0.013   0.036   513 
Diversifying 0.232 0.217 0.247 0.175 0.274 0.031   0.099 *** 513 
Target M&A committee 0.298 0.323 0.274 0.350 0.260 -0.049   -0.090 ** 513 
Board meeting count 5.676 5.449 5.900 2.802 7.784 0.451   4.982 *** 513 
Days to first board meeting 52.014 90.118 14.645 61.548 45.024 -75.473 *** -16.525 *** 513 
Governance Characteristics of Target                     
Independent director percentage 0.918 0.909 0.927 0.926 0.912 0.017   -0.014   513 
Board size 8.386 8.213 8.556 8.908 8.003 0.343   -0.904 *** 513 
Dual CEO 0.427 0.453 0.402 0.438 0.419 -0.051   -0.019   513 
Shareholder wealth gains                     
Target CAR 0.199 0.174 0.220 0.193 0.199 0.045 *** 0.007   513 
Takeover premium 0.304 0.301 0.313 0.307 0.302 0.012   -0.005   500 
Acquirer CAR -0.012 -0.019 -0.006 -0.016 -0.011 0.013 * 0.005   513 
Combined CAR 0.009 0.001 0.014 0.004 0.011 0.014 *** 0.007 * 513 
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Table 3.3 Multivariate analysis of target cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for target cumulative abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the target over the event 
window (-5, +5). The early board involvement variable equals one if the target board meets 
within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The high meeting 
count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held during the merger 
talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. High shareholder control dummy equals 1 
when CEO and board chair positions are separated, CEO ownership is less than 20%, CEO 
tenure is less than 5 years and percentage of independent directors is greater than 60%. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are 
suppressed. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Early board involvement 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 
  (2.694) (2.767) (2.992) (3.316) 
High meeting count 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.005 
  (0.544) (0.319) (0.104) (0.202) 
High shareholder control       0.006 
        (0.189) 
Early board involvement * High sh. control       -0.076* 
        (-1.728) 
Diversifying deal   -0.031 -0.034 -0.029 
    (-1.292) (-1.406) (-1.178) 
Tender offer   0.043 0.041 0.039 
    (1.070) (1.012) (0.957) 
Hostile deal   -0.014 -0.001 0.005 
    (-0.237) (-0.011) (0.076) 
Any stock payment   -0.048* -0.050* -0.057** 
    (-1.877) (-1.840) (-2.102) 
Competition   -0.034 -0.033 -0.035 
    (-1.596) (-1.477) (-1.589) 
Toehold   -0.006 0.018 -0.008 
    (-0.093) (0.266) (-0.118) 
Seller initiated   -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 
    (-0.542) (-0.413) (-0.477) 
Local deal   0.008 0.004 0.002 
    (0.356) (0.187) (0.082) 
Fairness opinion obtained   -0.013 -0.008 -0.020 
    (-0.441) (-0.271) (-0.661) 
Private negotiation process duration (months)   -0.006** -0.004 -0.004 
    (-1.983) (-1.345) (-1.157) 
Target termination fee dummy   0.041 0.034 0.040 
    (0.845) (0.691) (0.835) 
ln(Relative size)   -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
    (-4.638) (-4.197) (-4.208) 
ln(Target size)   -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.029*** 
    (-2.755) (-2.741) (-3.130) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.3 (Continued)  
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target Tobin's Q   -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 
    (-1.025) (-1.054) (-1.006) 
Target leverage   0.065 0.067 0.063 
    (0.605) (0.625) (0.604) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) > 0   -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.066*** 
    (-3.920) (-3.800) (-3.443) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q   0.015 0.016 0.016 
    (1.205) (1.330) (1.282) 
Acquirer leverage   -0.037 -0.025 -0.027 
    (-0.484) (-0.313) (-0.353) 
M&A Committee     -0.053** -0.049** 
      (-2.343) (-2.152) 
Target board size     0.009* 0.009* 
      (1.857) (1.707) 
Independent board     0.031   
      (0.832)   
Dual CEO     -0.022   
      (-1.192)   
% of busy directors     0.091 0.071 
      (1.526) (1.174) 
Target board tenure     0.002 0.002 
      (0.728) (0.856) 
CEO ownership     0.368**   
      (2.087)   
Independent director ownership     0.147 0.162 
      (0.864) (0.978) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.015 -0.011 
      (-0.257) (-0.199) 
Board interlock     -0.061 -0.063 
      (-1.160) (-1.319) 
Constant 0.204*** 0.327*** 0.188* 0.262*** 
  (12.146) (4.017) (1.798) (2.609) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.015 0.339 0.373 0.370 
Sample size 513 482 473 473 
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Table 3.4 Multivariate analysis of takeover premiums 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for takeover premiums. The dependent variable 
is the offer price divided by the price of the target stock 64 trading days prior to deal 
announcement minus 1. The early board involvement variable equals one if the target board 
meets within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The high 
meeting count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held during the 
merger talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. High shareholder control dummy 
equals 1 when CEO and board chair positions are separated, CEO ownership is less than 20%, 
CEO tenure is less than 5 years and percentage of independent directors is greater than 60%. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are 
suppressed. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Early board involvement 0.039 0.039 0.043 0.057* 
  (1.386) (1.457) (1.542) (1.866) 
High meeting count -0.002 -0.003 -0.017 -0.005 
  (-0.054) (-0.093) (-0.515) (-0.161) 
High shareholder control       -0.044 
        (-0.867) 
Early board involvement * High sh. control       -0.070 
        (-1.027) 
Diversifying deal   -0.038 -0.046 -0.035 
    (-1.117) (-1.331) (-1.014) 
Tender offer   0.078 0.091 0.074 
    (1.317) (1.536) (1.278) 
Hostile deal   -0.085 -0.066 -0.054 
    (-0.868) (-0.755) (-0.691) 
Any stock payment   -0.037 -0.040 -0.045 
    (-0.994) (-1.041) (-1.182) 
Competition   0.026 0.019 0.020 
    (0.911) (0.636) (0.669) 
Toehold   0.015 0.038 0.018 
    (0.144) (0.371) (0.185) 
Seller initiated   -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.082*** 
    (-2.692) (-2.864) (-2.683) 
Local deal   0.010 0.017 0.009 
    (0.326) (0.502) (0.267) 
Fairness opinion obtained   -0.041 -0.027 -0.035 
    (-1.004) (-0.654) (-0.862) 
Private negotiation process duration (months)   -0.009* -0.007 -0.007 
    (-1.911) (-1.557) (-1.550) 
Target termination fee dummy   0.169*** 0.138** 0.144*** 
    (2.984) (2.577) (2.765) 
ln(Relative size)   -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 
    (-0.989) (-0.503) (-0.551) 
ln(Target size)   -0.031*** -0.028** -0.033*** 
    (-3.014) (-2.202) (-2.662) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Target leverage   0.081 0.116 0.097 
    (0.630) (0.889) (0.750) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) > 0   -0.038 -0.050* -0.036 
    (-1.418) (-1.778) (-1.288) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q   -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
    (-0.084) (-0.085) (-0.040) 
Acquirer leverage   -0.189 -0.197 -0.202* 
    (-1.572) (-1.569) (-1.670) 
M&A Committee     -0.054* -0.053* 
      (-1.653) (-1.676) 
Target board size     -0.001 -0.001 
      (-0.214) (-0.104) 
Independent board     -0.103**   
      (-2.094)   
Dual CEO     -0.023   
      (-0.856)   
% of busy directors     0.090 0.051 
      (1.048) (0.606) 
Target board tenure     0.003 0.003 
      (0.787) (0.908) 
CEO ownership     0.310   
      (1.514)   
Independent director ownership     0.319 0.264 
      (1.413) (1.202) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.015 0.000 
      (-0.169) (0.003) 
Board interlock     -0.197** -0.191** 
      (-2.140) (-2.131) 
Constant 0.307*** 0.615*** 0.645*** 0.630*** 
  (12.107) (5.040) (4.314) (4.647) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 -0.000 0.174 0.192 0.193 
Sample size 500 469 461 461 
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Table 3.5 Multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the acquirer over the event 
window (-5, +5). The early board involvement variable equals one if the target board meets 
within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The high meeting 
count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held during the merger 
talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Early board involvement 0.008 0.004 0.006 
  (1.251) (0.501) (0.898) 
High meeting count 0.007 0.004 0.006 
  (1.050) (0.458) (0.709) 
Diversifying deal   0.000 -0.001 
    (0.012) (-0.121) 
Tender offer   -0.006 -0.007 
    (-0.509) (-0.537) 
Hostile deal   0.016 0.011 
    (0.865) (0.599) 
Any stock payment   -0.044*** -0.040*** 
    (-4.571) (-4.043) 
Competition   -0.003 -0.001 
    (-0.395) (-0.201) 
Toehold   -0.035 -0.030 
    (-1.645) (-1.427) 
Seller initiated   -0.008 -0.007 
    (-0.949) (-0.917) 
Local deal   -0.001 -0.004 
    (-0.162) (-0.527) 
Fairness opinion obtained   0.004 0.000 
    (0.254) (0.014) 
Private negotiation process duration (months)   0.001 0.001 
    (0.508) (0.912) 
Target termination fee dummy   -0.013 -0.021 
    (-0.859) (-1.411) 
ln(Relative size)   -0.003 -0.002 
    (-1.403) (-0.913) 
ln(Target size)   -0.002 -0.002 
    (-0.746) (-0.684) 
Target Tobin's Q   -0.001 -0.001 
    (-0.235) (-0.288) 
Target leverage   -0.027 -0.034 
    (-0.982) (-1.199) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) > 0   0.001 0.002 
    (0.174) (0.224) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.5 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q   0.003 0.002 
    (0.539) (0.454) 
Acquirer leverage   0.082** 0.084** 
    (1.980) (2.026) 
M&A Committee     -0.002 
      (-0.181) 
Target board size     0.000 
      (0.062) 
Independent board     0.010 
      (0.588) 
Dual CEO     0.000 
      (0.029) 
% of busy directors     0.032 
      (1.192) 
Target board tenure     0.000 
      (0.171) 
CEO ownership     0.043 
      (0.632) 
Independent director ownership     0.067 
      (1.170) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.017 
      (-0.606) 
Board interlock     -0.008 
      (-0.309) 
Constant -0.025*** 0.046 0.032 
  (-4.379) (1.475) (0.810) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.002 0.086 0.087 
Sample size 513 482 473 
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Table 3.6 Multivariate analysis of combined cumulative abnormal returns 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for cumulative abnormal returns accruing to 
the combined entity (CCAR). The dependent variable is calculated as the abnormal returns 
accruing to a value-weighted portfolio of the target and the acquirer over the event window (-5, 
+5), with portfolio weights based on each firm’s market value of equity as of the 64th trading 
day before the deal announcement. The early board involvement variable equals one if the target 
board meets within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The 
high meeting count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held during 
the merger talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Early board involvement 0.017** 0.007 0.009 
  (2.575) (1.008) (1.274) 
High meeting count 0.010 0.008 0.010 
  (1.445) (1.083) (1.291) 
Diversifying deal   -0.005 -0.007 
    (-0.579) (-0.764) 
Tender offer   -0.001 -0.001 
    (-0.049) (-0.111) 
Hostile deal   0.083*** 0.080*** 
    (3.136) (3.166) 
Any stock payment   -0.041*** -0.037*** 
    (-4.923) (-4.206) 
Competition   -0.010 -0.009 
    (-1.451) (-1.295) 
Toehold   -0.007 -0.001 
    (-0.180) (-0.036) 
Seller initiated   -0.004 -0.004 
    (-0.480) (-0.469) 
Local deal   -0.001 -0.004 
    (-0.156) (-0.598) 
Fairness opinion obtained   -0.009 -0.009 
    (-0.633) (-0.654) 
Private negotiation process duration (months)   -0.001 -0.000 
    (-0.670) (-0.114) 
Target termination fee dummy   -0.008 -0.017 
    (-0.486) (-1.033) 
ln(Relative size)   0.012*** 0.014*** 
    (5.453) (6.064) 
ln(Target size)   -0.004* -0.004 
    (-1.680) (-1.300) 
Target Tobin's Q   0.000 -0.000 
    (0.066) (-0.078) 
Target leverage   -0.044 -0.048* 
    (-1.644) (-1.792) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) > 0   -0.016** -0.016** 
    (-2.375) (-2.454) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q   0.002 0.001 
    (0.365) (0.304) 
Acquirer leverage   0.084** 0.083** 
    (2.352) (2.317) 
M&A Committee     -0.007 
      (-0.901) 
Target board size     0.001 
      (0.389) 
Independent board     0.015 
      (0.966) 
Dual CEO     -0.005 
      (-0.759) 
% of busy directors     0.017 
      (0.720) 
Target board tenure     0.001 
      (0.870) 
CEO ownership     0.067 
      (1.054) 
Independent director ownership     0.054 
      (1.008) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.040* 
      (-1.681) 
Board interlock     0.008 
      (0.255) 
Constant 0.002 0.110*** 0.084** 
  (0.367) (3.776) (2.179) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.014 0.164 0.182 
Sample size 513 482 473 
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Table 3.7 Determinants of competition in the private takeover process 
 
This table reports the results of logistic models designed to estimate the probability of a 
competitive private takeover process. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the number of 
parties that made a formal bid for the target in the private takeover process exceeds one, and 
zero otherwise. The early board involvement variable equals one if the target board meets 
within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. The high meeting 
count variable is equal to one if the number of target board meetings held during the merger 
talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Early board involvement 0.103 0.146 0.061 
  (0.540) (0.741) (0.286) 
High meeting count 0.121 0.098 0.235 
  (0.604) (0.460) (1.009) 
ln(Relative size) -0.042 -0.051 0.074 
  (-0.649) (-0.745) (0.919) 
Target size -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 
  (-1.775) (-1.927) (-1.157) 
All cash payment 0.908*** 0.875*** 0.859*** 
  (3.767) (3.511) (3.191) 
Tender offer 0.243 -0.084 -0.069 
  (0.750) (-0.237) (-0.184) 
Buyer initiated -0.772*** -0.800*** -0.887*** 
  (-3.944) (-3.895) (-3.983) 
Target in regulated ind. 0.679** 0.771 0.899 
  (2.545) (1.120) (1.160) 
Toehold -0.408 -0.332 -0.205 
  (-0.597) (-0.481) (-0.335) 
Target idiosyncratic vol. -15.674 -20.127* -15.596 
  (-1.626) (-1.869) (-1.384) 
M&A Committee     0.960*** 
      (4.002) 
Target board size     -0.021 
      (-0.397) 
Independent board     -0.277 
      (-0.713) 
Dual CEO     -0.150 
      (-0.675) 
% of busy directors     -0.374 
      (-0.535) 
Target board tenure     0.042 
      (1.424) 
CEO ownership     -0.472 
      (-0.306) 
(Continued on next page) 
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 Table 3.7 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Independent director ownership     2.897** 
      (2.218) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -1.966** 
      (-2.215) 
Board interlock     -2.437* 
      (-1.933) 
Constant -0.266 -0.611 -0.613 
  (-0.630) (-0.785) (-0.543) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.084 0.109 0.169 
Sample size 513 513 503 
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Table 3.8 Determinants of excessive target termination fee 
 
This table reports the results of logistic models designed to estimate the probability of an 
excessive target termination fee. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the target termination 
fee exceeds 3% of the deal value, and zero otherwise. The early board involvement variable 
equals one if the target board meets within a month of the date of first contact between the 
target and the acquirer. The high meeting count variable is equal to one if the number of target 
board meetings held during the merger talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies 
are suppressed. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Early board involvement -0.367* -0.370* -0.382* 
  (-1.922) (-1.869) (-1.878) 
High meeting count -0.353* -0.435** -0.421* 
  (-1.736) (-2.021) (-1.852) 
Acquirer termination fee dummy -0.082 -0.174 -0.173 
  (-0.319) (-0.672) (-0.622) 
Premium -0.594* -0.607 -0.679* 
  (-1.713) (-1.637) (-1.759) 
Competition 0.241 0.283 0.330 
  (1.191) (1.358) (1.485) 
Any cash payment -0.013 0.035 0.039 
  (-0.057) (0.148) (0.150) 
Diversifying deal 0.005 -0.059 -0.078 
  (0.020) (-0.236) (-0.311) 
Hostile deal -0.468 -0.519 -0.469 
  (-0.727) (-0.791) (-0.712) 
Tender offer 0.308 0.354 0.447 
  (0.913) (0.960) (1.218) 
Toehold (Officer_2003) -0.245 -0.209 -0.181 
  (-0.342) (-0.297) (-0.269) 
Financial services 0.501** 0.248 0.059 
  (2.037) (0.240) (0.055) 
ln(Target size) -0.264*** -0.233** -0.186* 
  (-3.201) (-2.519) (-1.662) 
ln(Acquirer size) 0.139** 0.142** 0.129* 
  (2.131) (2.040) (1.705) 
M&A Committee     -0.451* 
      (-1.919) 
% of busy directors     -0.958 
      (-1.499) 
Target board size     0.019 
      (0.345) 
Target board tenure     0.022 
      (0.752) 
Independent board     -0.030 
      (-0.086) 
(Continued on next page) 
  
 107 
Table 3.8 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
CEO ownership     0.277 
      (0.177) 
Dual CEO     0.016 
      (0.072) 
Independent director ownership     1.197 
      (0.842) 
Board interlock     -0.154 
      (-0.209) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.029 
      (-0.038) 
Constant 1.099** 1.926** 1.732 
  (2.039) (2.107) (1.569) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.0577 0.0800 0.0882 
Sample size 500 500 491 
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Table 3.9 Determinants of target CEO retention 
 
This table reports the results of logistic models designed to estimate the probability of the target 
CEO being retained on the combined firm’s board. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
target CEO serves on the combined firm’s board after the deal is completed, and zero otherwise. 
The early board involvement variable equals one if the target board meets within a month of the 
date of first contact between the target and the acquirer. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies are suppressed. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In parentheses are t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model 
(1) (2) 
Early board involvement -0.672** -0.655** 
  (-2.108) (-1.965) 
CEO tenure 0.049* 0.045* 
  (1.950) (1.645) 
CEO passed retirement age -0.177 -0.144 
  (-0.231) (-0.174) 
ln(Target size) 0.125 0.085 
  (1.184) (0.796) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.149 0.313** 
  (1.328) (2.076) 
Target leverage 0.149 0.152 
  (0.132) (0.119) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) -0.698* -0.782** 
  (-1.934) (-1.964) 
Relative size 1.057*** 1.369*** 
  (3.635) (4.093) 
All stock payment 0.888** 1.005*** 
  (2.534) (2.583) 
Diversifying deal -0.672 -0.582 
  (-1.522) (-1.328) 
Hostile deal -1.021 -1.264 
  (-0.696) (-0.892) 
Competition 0.172 0.275 
  (0.533) (0.784) 
Local deal -0.003 -0.237 
  (-0.008) (-0.635) 
Merger of equals 2.452*** 17.779*** 
  (2.646) (17.646) 
Constant -3.628*** -5.407*** 
  (-4.704) (-3.842) 
Industry dummies No Yes 
Year dummies No Yes 
Pseudo R^2 0.182 0.250 
Sample size 438 428 
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Table 3.10 Multivariate analysis of target CARs (Robustness) 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for target cumulative abnormal returns. The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns accruing to the target over the event 
window (-5, +5). The “early board involvement (no bid)” variable equals one if the target board 
meets within a month of the date of first contact between the target and the acquirer, without 
receiving a bid. The “early board involvement (with bid)” variable equals 1 if the target board 
meets within a month of the date of first contact and receives a formal bid from the acquirer 
before the meeting. The high meeting count variable is equal to one if the number of target 
board meetings held during the merger talks is greater than or equal to the median value of 5. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. The coefficients of year and industry dummies 
are suppressed. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In 
parentheses are t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Early board involvement (no bid) 0.044* 0.042** 0.053** 
  (1.837) (1.971) (2.436) 
Early board involvement (with bid) 0.086*** 0.081*** 0.069** 
  (2.709) (2.787) (2.317) 
High meeting count 0.017 0.010 0.004 
  (0.786) (0.436) (0.159) 
Diversifying deal   -0.030 -0.034 
    (-1.251) (-1.388) 
Tender offer   0.043 0.041 
    (1.046) (1.005) 
Hostile deal   -0.017 -0.002 
    (-0.289) (-0.034) 
Any stock payment   -0.048* -0.051* 
    (-1.863) (-1.839) 
Competition   -0.036* -0.034 
    (-1.685) (-1.501) 
Toehold   -0.004 0.018 
    (-0.061) (0.279) 
Seller initiated   -0.014 -0.010 
    (-0.606) (-0.443) 
Local deal   0.007 0.004 
    (0.324) (0.176) 
Fairness opinion obtained   -0.016 -0.010 
    (-0.556) (-0.331) 
Private negotiation process duration (months)   -0.006* -0.004 
    (-1.829) (-1.295) 
Target termination fee dummy   0.037 0.033 
    (0.755) (0.667) 
ln(Relative size)   -0.040*** -0.038*** 
    (-4.734) (-4.247) 
ln(Target size)   -0.022*** -0.026*** 
    (-2.607) (-2.681) 
Target Tobin's Q   -0.014 -0.015 
    (-0.996) (-1.038) 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table 3.10 (Continued) 
  Model Model Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Target leverage   0.064 0.066 
    (0.595) (0.614) 
Target adjusted return (-316, -64) > 0   -0.074*** -0.074*** 
    (-3.989) (-3.819) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q   0.015 0.017 
    (1.202) (1.334) 
Acquirer leverage   -0.044 -0.027 
    (-0.567) (-0.342) 
M&A Committee     -0.052** 
      (-2.216) 
Target board size     0.009* 
      (1.847) 
Independent board     0.030 
      (0.803) 
Dual CEO     -0.022 
      (-1.136) 
% of busy directors     0.090 
      (1.491) 
Target board tenure     0.002 
      (0.700) 
CEO ownership     0.365** 
      (2.077) 
Independent director ownership     0.150 
      (0.879) 
Target directors retained as % of target board     -0.010 
      (-0.174) 
Board interlock     -0.061 
      (-1.163) 
Constant 0.202*** 0.326*** 0.189* 
  (11.993) (4.074) (1.816) 
Industry dummies No Yes Yes 
Year dummies No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R^2 0.013 0.288 0.305 
Sample size 513 482 473 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A List of Keywords Used to Identify Ties 
For the analysis in Chapter 2, I use the following list of keywords for identifying 
social ties from merger-related articles obtained from Dow Jones Factiva database: 
 
friend, personal/personally, familiar, non-business, informal, professionally, 
acquainted, affiliation, social/socially, relationship, know/knew/known each other, well 
known to one another, know/knew/known one another, know/knew/known her, 
know/knew/known him, encountered, serve/served on, serve/served as, resign/resigned, 
resignation, recuse/recused, abstain/abstained, conflict of interest, from time to time, 
acquaintance, personally, I have known, I’ve known, she/he has known, lunch, 
breakfast, dinner, tie, work/working/worked with, work/working/worked together, 
casually, former employee, former employer, long standing
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APPENDIX B Variable Definitions 
Table A.1 Variable definitions 
 
Variables Definitions   Data sources 
Panel A: Social tie variables 
Any tie Dummy variable: 1 if the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm 
social tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target, 0 otherwise.    
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Close tie Dummy variable: 1 the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social 
tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target and that the connected individuals 
know each other very well or that they are friends or are very familiar with each other, 0 otherwise.   
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Distant tie Dummy variable: 1 the merger-related M&A filings or news articles report the existence of a cross-firm social 
tie between the directors or top executives of the acquirer and the target but the tie is not close, 0 otherwise.   
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Panel B: Target board activity variables 
Board meeting count The number of target board meetings from the date of first serious contact between the target and acquirer to 
the date of announcement. 
  M&A filings 
Days to first board meeting The number of days it takes for the target board to hold its first meeting after the date of first serious contact 
between the target and acquirer. 
  M&A filings 
Early board involvement Dummy variable: 1 if the target board meets within a month of the date of first contact between the target and 
the acquirer. 
  M&A filings 
Early board involvement              
(with bid) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target board meets within a month of the date of first contact and receives a formal 
bid from the acquirer before the meeting. 
  M&A filings 
Early board involvement          
(no bid) 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target board meets within a month of the date of first contact between the target and 
the acquirer, without receiving a bid. 
  M&A filings 
High meeting count Dummy variable: 1 if the number of target board meetings held during the merger talks is greater than or 
equal to the median value of 5. 
  M&A filings 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Variables Definitions   Data sources 
Panel C: Measures of merger performance 
ACAR(-5, +5) Cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer over the period (-5, +5) relative to the deal announcement date, 
calculated based on the market model. The market model is estimated over the period (-316, -64) with the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio used as the market index. 
  CRSP 
CCAR(-5, +5) Cumulative abnormal return for a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target over the period (-5, 
+5) relative to the deal announcement date, calculated based on the market model.  The weights of the target 
and acquirer are calculated based on their market value of equity as of the 64th trading day before deal 
announcement. If the acquirer has a toehold in the target, target’s weight is adjusted for this toehold. The 
market model is estimated over the period (-316, -64) with the CRSP value-weighted portfolio used as the 
market index. 
  CRSP 
Takeover premium The offer price divided by the price of the target stock 64 trading days prior to deal announcement minus 1.   SDC/CRSP 
TCAR(-5, +5) Cumulative abnormal return for the target over the period (-5, +5) relative to the deal announcement date, 
calculated based on the market model. The market model is estimated over the period (-316, -64) with the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio used as the market index. 
  CRSP 
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
Adjusted return (-316, -64) The buy-and-hold abnormal return over the period (-316, -64) for the firm, calculated as the difference 
between the buy-and-hold return for the firm minus the buy-and-hold return to the CRSP value-weighted 
index over the same period. 
  CRSP 
Firm in regulated industry Dummy variable: 1 if the firm operates in a regulated (finance or utilities) industry, 0 otherwise.   Compustat 
Firm size ($ mil) Inflation adjusted market value of equity in millions as of the 64th trading day before deal announcement.   CRSP 
Idiosycnratic volatility The standard deviation of the residuals from the market model estimated over the period (-316, -64) relative to 
the deal announcement date. 
  CRSP 
Leverage Book value of debt over market value of total assets as of the fiscal year-end prior to the deal announcement.   Compustat 
ln(# of industries) Natural logarithm of the total number of different 4-digit SIC codes the firm operates in.   SDC 
Pre-3 years no of deals Total number of mergers or acquisitions of majority interest attempted or completed by the firm in the 3 years 
preceding the deal announcement.   
SDC 
Tobin's q Market value of assets over book value of assets as of the fiscal year-end prior to the deal announcement.   Compustat 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Variables Definitions   Data sources 
Panel E: Deal characteristics 
All cash payment Dummy variable: 1 if deal is financed 100% with cash, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
All stock payment Dummy variable: 1 if deal is financed 100% with acquirer stock, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Any cash payment Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is financed partially or fully with cash, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Any stock payment Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is financed partially or fully with acquirer stock, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Board interlock Dummy variable: 1 if at least one of the target directors is also a director of the acquirer, 0 otherwise.   M&A filings 
Buyer initiated Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is buyer-initiated, 0 otherwise.   M&A filings 
Competition Dummy variable: 1 if the number of parties that made a formal bid for the target in the private takeover 
process exceeds one, 0 otherwise. 
  M&A filings 
Diversifying deal Dummy variable: 1 if bidder and target do not share the same Fama French - 48 industry, 0 otherwise .   Compustat 
Fairness opinion obtained Dummy variable: 1 if the target has obtained a fairness opinion, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Financial services Dummy variable: 1 if both the acquirer and target are in the financial services industry, 0 otherwise.   Compustat 
Hostile deal Dummy variable: 1 if the bid is recorded by SDC as hostile or unsolicited, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
ln(Financial advisory fees) Natural logarithm of the inflation adjusted financial advisory fees paid by the firm.   SDC 
Local deal Dummy variable: 1 if the headquarters of the merging firms are within 100 kilometers of each other, 0 
otherwise. 
  SDC 
M&A committee Dummy variable: 1 if the target has an M&A special committee, 0 otherwise.   M&A filings 
Merger of equals Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is a merger of equals, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Number of T&A advisors Total number of target and acquirer financial advisors.   SDC 
Private negotiation process 
duration/length 
The length of the period from the date of first serious contact between the target and acquirer to the date of 
announcement. 
  M&A filings 
Relative size Deal value divided by acquirer’s market value of equity as of the 64th trading day before deal announcement.   SDC/CRSP 
Seller initiated Dummy variable: 1 if the deal is seller-initiated, 0 otherwise.   M&A filings 
Target directors retained as a % 
of combined firm board 
The number of target directors who remain on the board of the combined firm as a percentage of the board 
size of the combined firm.   
DEF-14A filings 
Target directors retained as a % 
of target board 
The number of target directors who remain on the board of the combined firm as a percentage of pre-
acquisition target board size. 
  DEF-14A filings 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Variables Definitions   Data sources 
Panel E: Deal characteristics (Continued) 
Tender offer Dummy variable: 1 if the bid is recorded by SDC as a tender offer, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Termination fee dummy Dummy variable: 1 if the termination fee to be paid is nonzero, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Toehold Dummy variable: 1 if the acquirer owns a non-zero percentage of target’s stock prior to deal announcement, 0 
otherwise. 
  SDC 
Toehold (Officer, 2003) Dummy variable: 1 if the acquirer owns more than 5% of target's stock price, 0 otherwise.   SDC 
Panel F: Target governance characteristics 
Board size Number of directors serving on the board.   DEF-14A filings 
Board tenure Average tenure of directors on the board.   DEF-14A filings 
High shareholder control Dummy variable: 1 if CEO and board chair positions are separated, CEO ownership is less than 20%, CEO 
tenure is less than 5 years and percentage of independent directors is greater than 60%, 0 otherwise. 
  DEF-14A filings 
Independent board Dummy variable: 1 if the percentage of independent directors is greater than 0.5 in the board, 0 otherwise.   DEF-14A filings 
Independent director ownership The sum of the number of options exercisable within 60 days as of the date of the proxy statement and the 
number of shares held by independent directors divided by the number of outstanding shares of the firm. 
  DEF-14A filings 
Independent director 
percentage 
The percentage of independent directors on the board.   DEF-14A filings 
Other directorships Average number of other directorships held by independent directors of the firm.   DEF-14A filings 
Outside director percentage The percentage of outside directors (independent & grey directors) on the board.   DEF-14A filings 
Percentage of busy directors The number of independent directors who hold two or more directorships in other public firms as a percentage 
of the board size. 
  DEF-14A filings 
Panel G: CEO characteristics 
CEO ownership The sum of the number of options exercisable within 60 days as of the date of the proxy statement and the 
number of shares held by the CEO divided by the number of outstanding shares of the firm. 
  DEF-14A filings 
CEO passed retirement age Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is older than 65 years old as of the proxy statement prior to deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise. 
  DEF-14A filings 
CEO tenure The number of years the CEO has been on board as of the proxy statement prior to deal announcement.   DEF-14A filings 
Dual CEO Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO also chairs the board, 0 otherwise.   DEF-14A filings 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Variables Definitions   Data sources 
Panel H: Director characteristics 
Close tie due to another person Dummy variable: 1 if the target has a close tie to the acquirer via an individual other than the current director. 
  
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Director is CEO Dummy variable: 1 if the director is also the CEO, 0 otherwise.   DEF-14A filings 
Director passed retirement age Dummy variable: 1 if the director is older than 65 years old as of the proxy statement prior to deal 
announcement, 0 otherwise.   
DEF-14A filings 
Director retained Dummy variable: 1 if the target director is retained on the board of the combined firm, 0 otherwise.   DEF-14A filings 
Director tenure The number of years the director has been on board as of the proxy statement prior to deal announcement.   DEF-14A filings 
Director with a close tie Dummy variable: 1 if the director has a close tie with a director or executive of the acquirer, 0 otherwise. 
  
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Director with a distant tie Dummy variable: 1 if the director has a distant tie with a director or executive of the acquirer, 0 otherwise. 
  
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Director with a tie Dummy variable: 1 if the director is connected to a director or executive of the acquirer, 0 otherwise. 
  
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
Distant tie due to another 
person 
Dummy variable: 1 if the target has a distant tie to the acquirer via an individual other than the current 
director.   
M&A 
filings/Factiva 
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